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Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order. By
Barbara A. Misztal. Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 1996. Pp. vii1296.
$54.95.
Chris Snijders
Utrecht University
Barbara Misztal sets out to argue that certain changes in contemporary
societies make the construction of trust more urgent and that the nature
of trust necessary to sustain social order and the quality of social relation-
ships is changing (pp. 8–10). Since trust can mean many things, the au-
thor first presents an extensive and thorough discussion on the diverse
meanings attached to the word by other scholars and its relation to simi-
lar concepts such as “faith” and “confidence.” Misztal furthermore notices
shortcomings in the self-evident nature of trust that classical sociologists
such as Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber seem to propose and discerns
three different kinds of trust connected with three different kinds of social
order. Stable order is the kind of order in which trust is apparent as a
routine background to everyday interaction. Here, trust consists of the
formation of habits, reputations, and collective memory (trust as habitus).
People are able to live more pleasantly given justifiable trust in their so-
cial environment. In cohesive order, trust is based on familiarity, bonds
of friendship, and common faith and values as experienced in bonds with
family, friends, and society (trust as passion). Finally, for collaborative
order one needs trust to cope with the freedom of others and foster coop-
eration (trust as policy). Trust in other people’s reciprocity is an aid to
overcome the detrimental effect of not being able to rely on others.
Misztal fills the last three of the book’s six chapters with an elaboration
of her typology, mainly by positioning other work on trust and social
order in this typology, thereby clarifying its meaning and impact. Taken
together these chapters form convincing evidence that trust can facilitate
social order in different ways and that the function of trust can be studied
in the light of its role in one of the three kinds of social order. This typol-
ogy and the place of classical and contemporary research on trust and
social order in this typology is, I think, Misztal’s main achievement and
one not to be underrated. The coverage of the literature on trust is excel-
lent and ranges from the above-mentioned classics of sociology to recent
contributions in anthropology, political science, and, of course, sociology.
The broad coverage of the literature is at the same time its weakness.
The majority of the book actually consists of giving the literature its place
The right to reprint a book review printed in this section may be obtained only from
the reviewer.
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in this new typology of social order, which easily distracts the reader from
the author’s reasoning. As the author argues (p. 9) it is one of her aims
“to collect evidence in support of the thesis concerned with the growing
significance of trust relationships.” Setting aside the fact that one should
not only look for supporting but also for other evidence, I think the book
would have benefited from shifting its emphasis away from being a pure
literature review and back to the reasoning underlying Misztal’s main
claim. The general argument is that the fact that trust gets increasingly
important has something to do with globalization, an increasing demand
for legitimacy of the state and increasing individualism. I am convinced
the author will argue that I missed some important points by summariz-
ing it this way, but this is almost inevitable given that the book is written
as an array of linked references, quite densely filled with direct one- or
two-sentence quotations from these references, and contains relatively lit-
tle direct argumentation.
To summarize, I think the typology of social order (and the functions
of trust in it) as set forward by the author is a useful one that can prevent
a lot of common misunderstandings with regard to trust. The coverage
and positioning of the literature on trust is outstanding, but unraveling
the main thrust of the author’s arguments about the increasing impor-
tance of trust is rather difficult.
Readers interested in an examination of which scholars occupy the so-
ciological stage with respect to trust or in how the classical sociologists
can be reinterpreted with respect to their position on social order should
definitely obtain a copy of this book. Readers with a relatively up-to-date
knowledge on the literature, who are willing to believe at the onset that
trust is a complex, multifaceted topic that gets increasingly important,
might find it enough just to scan the bibliography.
The Cooperator’s Dilemma. By Mark Irving Lichbach. Ann Arbor: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1996. Pp. xi1309. $39.50.
Edgar Kiser
University of Washington
Nothing better illustrates the increasing convergence of sociological and
economic theory than studies of collective action. Not that long ago, al-
most all economists and game theorists stressed the ubiquity of free riding
in the absence of selective incentives, while most sociologists argued that
cultural and structural factors were the sole determinants of collective
action. Although these types of arguments still persist in both disciplines,
many game theorists are now trying to model the social contexts of collec-
tive action, and many sociologists are taking the problem of free riding
seriously instead of assuming it away.
Mark Lichbach’s new book not only documents this trend, it illustrates
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the value of combining sociological and game theoretic insights. The Co-
operator’s Dilemma provides a comprehensive review of theories of
collective action that arose in response to Mancur Olson’s seminal work.
Lichbach knows both the sociological and economic literatures well and
is thus able to combine discussions of the Nash equilibrium in a noncoop-
erative game with analyses of arguments stressing values or power.
The book is organized around a typology of four proposed solutions
to the collective action problem. Market, or “invisible hand,” solutions try
to specify the conditions under which uncoordinated exchange relations
between individuals in a “state of nature” will result in collective action.
This set of solutions (Lichbach discusses 12 types in this category) focuses
on exogenous changes in the costs and benefits of participation, the nature
of the public good desired, the productivity of tactics, and the characteris-
tics of actors (such as their propensity to take risks).
Contract approaches focus on how individuals construct rules and in-
stitutions that create and maintain voluntary collective agreements with-
out third-party enforcement (i.e., states). This category includes various
forms of self-government, “tit-for-tat” solutions, and mutual exchange
agreements. This solution begins to incorporate more sociological factors,
mainly in the form of existing social networks that facilitate the informa-
tion flows necessary to monitor compliance.
The third and fourth solutions are more purely sociological, although
game theorists have begun to explore both. Community approaches as-
sume the prior existence of communal organizations with their shared
sets of beliefs and values. This is the classic “cultural” solution to the
collective action problem, and it works primarily through changing the
microfoundations of action from pure rational self-interest to a value-
based altruism toward the community. Hierarchy approaches assume the
existence of third-party enforcement in the form of institutions that coerce
individuals to contribute to public goods. This solution includes most
power-based sociological arguments about collective action.
Lichbach evaluates each of these solutions in terms of their logical com-
pleteness and logical consistency. He argues that all of the proposed solu-
tions are incomplete because each of them presupposes the existence of
at least one of the other solutions. For example, he argues that contract
solutions require markets to “permit parties to arrive at the terms of a
contract” (p. 25); market solutions require community to create the trust
needed to conduct market exchanges; community solutions require hier-
archy because common values must be authoritatively enforced; and hier-
archy requires contract “because in the very long run only mutually
agreed-upon coercion will be accepted” (p. 25). While Lichbach is cer-
tainly right that there is some interdependence between each of these
types of solutions, his argument that they always require other solutions
is overstated. Contracts have often been made in the absence of markets,
many markets are not supported by shared values, some communal val-
ues have persisted for centuries without hierarchical third-party enforce-
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ment, and some autocratic hierachies have lasted for centuries without
mutual contractual agreements between rulers and ruled.
Lichbach argues that many of the solutions to the collective action
problem are not logically consistent, since they jettison the collective ac-
tion research program’s core assumption of rational choice microfound-
ations (of course, this is not a core assumption for all who study collective
action; Lichbach clearly situates himself in the Olsonian tradition). Lich-
bach argues that the collective action research program should not en-
tirely abandon assumptions of rationality and self-interest (as many com-
munity solutions have), but they should not always retain the most
narrow version of these assumptions either. His quite reasonable proposal
is that rational choice microfoundations be used as an initial baseline and
that they should be broadened only when rational action alone cannot
account for collective action. This is an increasingly common position
among rational choice theorists, but its lineage can be traced to a sociolo-
gist, Max Weber.
Lichbach’s book illustrates the inevitable broadening of rational choice
models as they have moved from economics into political science and
sociology, at both the micro and macro levels of analysis. It should be a
valuable resource for anyone interested in surveying the range of solu-
tions to the problem of collective action.
Detraditionalization: Critical Reflections on Authority and Identity. Ed-
ited by Paul Heelas, Scott Lash, and Paul Morris. Cambridge, Mass.:
Blackwell Publishers, 1996. Pp. ix1347. $59.00 (cloth); $21.95 (paper).
David Ingram
Loyola University of Chicago
The decline of traditional authority and gemeinschaft, in the wake of
what, since Weber, has been customarily denoted as social and cultural
rationalization, has remained a popular theme among sociologists ever
since Marx and To¨nnies first broached the subject in the 19th century. As
this anthology amply attests, rapid changes in the structure of capitalism,
communication media, and international relations have provided a new
generation of postmodern sociologists with additional food for thought
on the subject. Here, in a single volume, an impressive cast of contribu-
tors range over such issues as postmodern morality, social systems com-
plexity, cybernetic subjectivity, global space-time compression, multicul-
tural immigration, and posttraditional communitarianism.
The volume’s 15 essays are grouped under four headings. The essays
grouped under the first heading, “Losing the Traditional,” basically sub-
scribe to the radical view that, as one of the contributor’s (John Thomp-
son) puts it, “with the development of modern societies, tradition gradu-
ally declines in significance and eventually ceases to play a meaningful
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role in the lives of most individuals” (p. 28). Thus, Ulrich Beck and Elisa-
beth Beck-Gernsheim argue in chapter 2 that what is historically new
about modern society is the emergence of radical individualism, in which
institutions like marriage no longer confront subjects as an objective force
limiting their free creativity. Individualism is also correlated with detra-
ditionalization in the essays by Zygmunt Bauman, Thomas Luckmann,
and Niklas Luhmann, in which the “break” separating traditional, stra-
tified society from functionally differentiated society is seen as generating
contingency in morals, preferences, and responsibilities, on the one side,
and a corresponding yearning for inviolate values, on the other.
The second group of essays takes issue with the “triumphalist” view of
detraditionalization emphasized above. The contributions in this section
challenge the very notion of periodizing a radical break between tradi-
tional and modern society, arguing either that so-called traditional societ-
ies exhibit an abundance of individualism (Barbara Adam, John B.
Thompson) or that so-called modern societies retain residues of tradition
(Timothy Luke, Colin Campbell). Although most of the contributors to
this coexistence thesis concede that detraditionalization has occurred,
they insist that traditions rely on individual critical reappropriations for
their continuous efficacy over time and space, and (conversely) that indi-
viduals rely on background habits for their freedom of thought. Luke, in
particular, does a credible job of showing not only how what we call the
modern has become traditional but also how (following David Harvey’s
well-known views about the postmodern condition) the compression of
space and time due to new techniques of mass production, mass con-
sumption, and mass communication has quickened the pace of life in
highly unsettling ways.
The essays in part 3 discuss specific modern traditions, such as nation-
alism, humanism, universalism, and pluralism, and their impact on such
notions as community, identity, and difference. Richard Sennett starts
things off by exploring the tension between the 19th-century ideology of
national identity—whose ethnocentrism resonates in the communitarian
refrain voiced by today’s advocates of a politics of cultural identity—
and the experience of belonging to a universal community, which is the
lot of the foreigner. Paul Heelas expands upon the notion of humanity
as a universal community, arguing along Durkheimian lines that such a
notion can serve as a solidifying morality against the relativism of more
exclusivist notions of community and identity. This view also informs
Scott Lash’s critique of deconstructive philosophies of difference (Heideg-
ger, Levinas, and Derrida), which fail to account for modern traditions
of intersubjectivity and solidarity. Finally, in marked contrast to the pre-
vious contributors, Paul Morris appeals to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy
in elaborating a deconstructive account of community that eschews tradi-
tional communitarian notions of identity, solidarity, continuity, and ho-
mogeneity. Especially intriguing is his insistence on the complementarity
of egalitarian, localized communities of descent and hierarchical, univer-
salistic communities of assent. The latter build on the former (as did early
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Christianity on Judaism) while infusing them with singular and utopian
meanings.
The last section, “Dissolving Detraditionalization,” contains two essays,
both inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, that take issue with the
notion that the so-called “autonomous subject” of modernity is either au-
tonomous or individual. Mark Poster, for example, argues that the mod-
ern subject is constituted by the effects of power relations that are con-
figured in normed discourses and practices. Furthermore, he adds that a
necessary correlate of the “autonomous individual” is a “superpanoptic,”
disciplinary society that conditions “subjects” as uniform (normal) yet de-
centered loci of habitual practices. Developing this position further, Niko-
las Rose concludes that the distinction between traditional and posttradi-
tional loses its significance once it is conceded that persons in all societies
are constituted by habitually ingrained norms of a heterogeneous and by
no means continuous nature.
In sum, although there have been numerous anthologies on traditional,
modern, and postmodern societies, few if any of them have devoted them-
selves as thoroughly to examining the validity of the conceptual distinc-
tions implicit in this periodization as this book has. Thus it is essential
reading for any scholar interested in what it means to be modern today.
Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. By
Michael J. Sandel. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996.
Pp. xi1417. $24.95.
Steven Tipton
Emory University
If every sociology implies an ethic, as philosophers insist, it is no less true
that every ethic implies a sociology. In making the latter point to political
philosophers, Michael Sandel has performed a valuable service, starting
with his criticism in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge
University Press, 1982) of the abstraction of the socially “unencumbered
self” at the center of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice (Harvard University
Press, 1971). In response, both philosophical defenders and critics of con-
temporary liberalism have grown more conscious of the sociology of the
modern welfare state that their ethics typically imply, and more able to
argue over its problematic premises and practices. The political salience
of this argument has mushroomed in an era that spans the end of Lyndon
Johnson’s Great Society and the rise of current efforts to “reform” welfare
for the children of the poor while protecting Social Security and Medicare
for the parents of the middle class.
At the heart of democracy’s discontent in our time, begins this book,
lie two fears—the loss of self-government and the erosion of community.
American political institutions embody ideals of justice and the good life
defined in terms of rights and obligations, freedom and citizenship, de-
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mocracy and law. So Sandel sets out to “identify the public philosophy
implicit in our practices and institutions and to show how tensions in the
philosophy show up in the practice” (p. ix). This may help us diagnose,
if not resolve, our political predicament, lodged as it is in the moral con-
trariety of the liberal and republican traditions of our public culture, not
only in the gap between our ideals and our institutions.
The liberal tradition conceives persons as free and independent selves,
unencumbered by moral or civic ties they have not chosen. Freedom con-
sists in the very capacity of such persons to choose their own values and
ends. The rival republican tradition conceives freedom as the fruit of
sharing in self-government with fellow citizens whose public-spirited
character is cultivated by these very practices of deliberating together
over common goods and sharing responsibility for the destiny of the polit-
ical community.
In the first third of the book, Sandel shows how central features of
“procedural liberalism” have come to inform the theory and practice of
American constitutional law and family law in recent decades. Fair pro-
cedures take priority over particular moral ends posed as public goods.
Individual rights function as moral trump cards, played to assure the
state’s neutrality among competing conceptions of the good life, in order
to respect persons as free selves capable of choosing their own ends. Prob-
lems in theory show up in practice. Our “procedural republic” offers a
kind of toleration undercut by its attempts at moral neutrality that often
rely on implicit answers to the controversies they seek to bracket, for
example, abortion. Treating persons as freely choosing, independent indi-
viduals may fail to respect persons encumbered by convictions or life
circumstances at odds with this liberal self-image, whether they be Sab-
bath observers, Holocaust survivors, feminists fighting pornography, ho-
mosexuals denied privacy, or homemaker-mothers impoverished by di-
vorce.
These practical difficulties, says Sandel, reflect liberalism’s priority of
the right to the good and of the self to its ends. Sandel doubts the capacity
of liberal toleration to “realize the higher pluralism of persons and com-
munities who appreciate and affirm the distinctive goods their different
lives express” (p. 116). He doubts, too, that the liberal self-image of our
times is adequate to self-government in the modern welfare state, for
democratic self-government depends on consciously cultivated, public-
spirited forms of republican citizenship at odds with individual auton-
omy. Moreover, the modern welfare state consists of a vast network of
mutual dependencies, obligations, and administrative rules at odds with
ideals of an unencumbered self at the hub of a social network of volun-
tary associations, free contracts, and consensual agreements. The expan-
sion of government and the dominance of large-scale corporations have
banished the voluntarist, autonomous self from contract law and from a
political-economic order “increasingly governed by vast structures of
power” (p. 118), Sandel observes. Meanwhile, ironically, this liberal self
has come to prevail in our constitutional law. There, it justifies individual
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autonomy in those matters of religion, speech, and sexual morality that
now mark our personal lives, as if to console us for the sense of indepen-
dent agency we have lost in public life.
The welfare state rings true to liberalism, grants Sandel, in its promise
to individuals of legal and civil rights and social and economic entitle-
ments. But public provision of these rights and entitlements depends on
citizens sharing “a strong sense of mutual responsibility and moral en-
gagement” (p. 119) in the common life of communities constituted by so-
cial practices that bind individual identities into social members obliged
to one another and devoted to common conceptions of the good life. With-
out cultivating community in this constitutive sense, Sandel contends, the
case for public provision in the procedural republic suffers a minimalism
similar to the case for toleration.
The latter two-thirds of the book shift from constitutional to political
debates. Stretching from Jefferson and Hamilton to Carter and Reagan,
this section traces a shifting dialogue between two logics of moral argu-
ment in posing the key questions of public life. How can citizens become
capable of self-government, asks the republican, who then seeks the social
conditions and political arrangements needed to promote the civic virtue
self-government requires and the liberty it breeds. The liberal first asks
how government should treat its citizens, then seeks the principles and
procedures of justice needed to treat persons fairly and equally as they
pursue their various ends and interests. Republicanism predominates ear-
lier in American history, liberalism later. But the two can be found count-
erposed all the way through, from deliberation over Virginia’s Port Bill
of 1784 to 20th-century debates over the New Deal, the Great Society,
and Reagan’s New Federalism. Noting expansion in the role of govern-
ment following the Civil War and then World Wars I and II, Sandel
seeks to show how the public philosophy of a procedural republic has
come to distinguish our increasingly activist state since the New Deal
and to frame the increasingly problematic terms of its justification (p.
124). The procedural republic, he judges, “cannot secure the liberty it
promises because it cannot inspire the moral and civic engagement self-
government requires” (p. 323).
What is to be done? The hope of our time, Sandel urges, rests with
those “who can summon the conviction and restraint to make sense of
our condition and repair the civic life on which democracy depends” (p.
351) in the corrective light of republican ideals. Is it possible to revitalize
republican ideals of freedom, given the scale and complexity of modern
society? Is it desirable, given their history of political exclusion and coer-
cion in the hands of would-be moral aristocrats? Against these objections,
Sandel follows Tocqueville’s tack in favor of a democratic republic that
is more clamorous than consensual, one that disperses state power and
multiplies sites of civic assembly and formation. Forgoing fundamentalist
moral absolutism on one side and protean moral drift on the other, San-
del’s republican citizens of the future must be able to “think and act as
multiply-situated selves” in democratic politics played out in social set-
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tings that range from local neighborhoods to global political institutions.
These citizens among us must be able to “negotiate our way among the
sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations that claim us,
and to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties give rise” (p. 350).
They must weave the various strands of their identity, culture, and insti-
tutional experience into a coherent whole in the form of moral narratives
that order our diverse lives, interpret the common life we share, and an-
chor our political community even as they enable us to argue over its
character, purposes, and ends.
This is certainly no small order. The reader may be forgiven for asking
how it is to be achieved and the author for offering in reply only exem-
plary bits and pieces of a daunting puzzle: the Civil Rights movement,
community development corporations, community organizing on the
model of the Industrial Areas Foundation; recent political rhetorics of
civic virtue and social responsibility to balance equal opportunity and
individual rights; global prospects for diffusing the sovereignty of na-
tional states into a multiplicity of more and less extensive communities
and political bodies (p. 345).
Like comparable works before it, including Habits of the Heart (Uni-
versity of California Press, 1985) and Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice
(Harvard University Press, 1982), Democracy’s Discontent lacks a blue-
print for repairing civic life in a democratic America. It also lacks a close
analysis of those forms of economic inequality and social exclusion that
bias our polity in the course of dividing Americans by class, race, gender,
and generation. Yet Sandel senses the heavy toll these divisions exact
from the coherence of public discourse and action in our time, and he
sketches a civic rationale for public provision and investment to reverse
them. Read in tandem with studies such as Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady’s Voice and Equality (Harvard University Press, 1995), Wilson’s
When Work Disappears (Knopf, 1996), and Fischer et al.’s Inequality by
Design (Princeton University Press, 1996), Sandel’s work sheds welcome
light on the powerfully contradictory moral rationale that justifies our
peculiar kind of political economy. In doing so, it underscores the need
for the middle-class majority of our electorate not simply to check their
interests and open their hearts, but to change their minds about our cul-
tural commonsense, if we are to change for the better the way our public
institutions work to secure justice, the general well-being, and the bless-
ings of liberty.
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Conspicuous Criticism: Tradition, the Individual, and Culture in Ameri-
can Social Thought, from Veblen to Mills. By Christopher Shannon. Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi1216.
Hans Joas
Free University of Berlin
The recent upsurge of interest in American pragmatism and the wide-
spread rediscovery of pre-Parsonian American social theory have in-
creased the quantity and quality of scholarly output in these fields. Many
of these contributions are clearly works of love, written to defend and
revitalize older, but neglected traditions.
The author of the present contribution makes it exceedingly clear that
he does not want to be counted among these lines of work. For him “criti-
cal, humanistic social science, so often arrayed against the market, has
just as often been at the vanguard of extending the logic of commodifica-
tion to the most intimate aspects of people’s lives” (p. xi).
Such a viewpoint is not completely new to those familiar with Mar-
cuse’s “repressive tolerance” and the historiography of Foucault and his
followers. But this is not the position from which this author argues. He
describes his own perspective as “the Roman Catholic insistence that rea-
son, belief, and even unbelief make sense only in the context of some
received tradition of inquiry” (p. xiv). His heroes are the late Christopher
Lasch and Alasdair MacIntyre. For him the rise of the work ethic in
Reformation Protestantism amounted almost to a new Fall of Man; any
critique of consumerism or the decline of communities based on the “pro-
ducer” values of this work ethic is doomed to failure.
Scientific discourse does not evaluate perspectives, but results. The
book contains critical interpretations and reexaminations of six crucial
contributions in American social science and cultural criticism: the work
of Thorstein Veblen, particularly his Instinct of Workmanship; the Mid-
dletown study of Robert Lynd and Helen Lynd; John Dewey’s diagnosis
of time in Individualism Old and New; Ruth Benedict’s Patterns of Cul-
ture; Robert Lynd’s Knowledge for What? and C. Wright Mills’s work,
particularly The Sociological Imagination. Shannon’s chapters on these
works are written in a deliberately provocative, sometimes brilliant, often
flamboyant style. The scholarly quality of these chapters is very uneven.
The first chapter (on Veblen) seems to me by far the best. The author
gives a circumspect and serious, if not innovative, interpretation of
Veblen’s work, focusing on the notion of workmanship. This makes
Veblen’s views on the history of mankind and the American present
look much more coherent and less idiosyncratic than they appear in other
interpretations.
The chapter on Dewey, on the other hand, is clearly behind contempo-
rary Dewey scholarship. The author introduces his interpretation by
sweeping and superficial criticisms of Tocqueville’s emphasis on volun-
tary associations and the expressive individualism of the Transcendental-
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ists (see, e.g., p. 66). The crucial point of his critique of Dewey is surpris-
ing indeed: “Dewey’s account of the lost individual proceeds from the
classical liberal insistence of the priority of instrumental, man-thing rela-
tions to substantive relations between men” (p. 70). Is the author not fa-
miliar with Dewey’s early neo-Hegelianism and its assumptions about
human intersubjectivity? How would he deal with Dewey’s use of George
Herbert Mead’s ideas about mutual role taking and the genesis of the
self?
The chapter on Mills attempts to demonstrate that this radical demo-
cratic critic of the welfare-warfare state himself had a considerable affin-
ity with technocracy. The author goes to great lengths (see p. 168) to
support this claim by citing Mills’s famous advice for the sociologist to
keep a journal of all scholarly and private life experience to draw upon
for research and writing. Mills himself compared the importance of a
journal for a sociologist with its importance for a creative writer. For
Shannon, such a journal is a kind of postmodern Puritan diary (p. 170)
as well as a bureaucratic file (“the epitome of the bureaucratic organiza-
tion of modern life” (p. 168) and “ultimately, the file is the factory that
produces the commodified perspectives which flood the free marketplace
of ideas” (p. 175). When self-exploration, bureaucratic administration,
and commercialization are all the same, all sociological distinctions col-
lapse.
When—to use Robert Bellah’s terms—utilitarian and expressive indi-
vidualism, Republicanism and Protestantism, are all considered alike in
their deficiencies, we learn too little about any of them. In his desire to
keep clear of the internal tensions of modernity, the author simply treats
all cats as grey in the dark night of modernity. He concludes his book
(pp. 186–88) with a polemic about abortion and a plea for “the great
surviving traditions of the postmodern West: orthodox Judaism, Roman
Catholicism, the Orthodox churches, and Islam.” He is aware that his
attempt to further his goals through this book on the history of the social
sciences leads him to a paradox: by offering a causal account of intellec-
tual-historical developments, Shannon, as he recognizes (p. xi), would
subtly reproduce the worldview he tries to avoid. His alternative is to
“offer not so much a causal account as an account of causality” (p. xi),
whatever this may exactly be. The book fails not only as a contribution
to intellectual history, but also—if I may respectfully say so—as a contri-
bution to modern Catholic thinking. Contemporary Catholicism cannot
avoid the pitfalls of modern culture, however much a quiet conservative
extremism may long for a complete revision of modern history.
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Paradoxes of Modernity: Culture and Conduct in the Theory of Max
Weber. By Wolfgang Schluchter. Translated by Neil Solomon. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996. Pp. 389. $49.50.
Stephen Kalberg
Boston University
Wolfgang Schluchter continues his massive exegesis of Max Weber’s
works in Paradoxes of Modernity. Part 1 “Truth, Power, and Ethics: Max
Weber’s Political-Philosophical Profile,” argues that Weber must be un-
derstood as a philosophical thinker. It first focuses upon his concern to
include ethical values in all political action. A chronology of Weber’s
political activities during World War I is offered and a detailed analysis
of the content and background of the “Science as a Vocation” lecture.
Schluchter calls attention to Weber’s broader questions: how do we live
ethically and what is the role of science and the nature of “vocational
duty” in the modern world? He contends that Weber’s politics were prin-
cipled and grounded in values rather than “power-obsessed.”
Schluchter seeks in chapter 2 “to uncover a typology of ethics that in
part guides [Weber’s] research” and, moreover, constitutes “Weber’s own
value position” (p. 50). This chapter interweaves Weber’s biography and
the Heidelberg social milieu with Weber’s early inaugural lecture, his
sociology of religion, and his writings on the Russian Revolution.
Schluchter finds strong evidence for Weber’s advocacy of ethical action
and rejection of moral agnosticism and relativism as well as the success-
oriented, adjustment-to-life, and eudaemonistic ethics. However, he in-
correctly states that Weber views an “orientation to values, especially to
ethical values, . . . as a general feature of human beings” (p. 121; my
emphasis).
Written with a deep sense of dedication, this chapter reveals the very
core of Weber’s appeal to Schluchter. In arguing his case for a distinction
in Weber’s writings between a formal and substantive ethic of responsi-
bility and a formal and substantive ethic of conviction, as well as between
an ethic of reflexive principle and an ethic of principles, and, finally, for
Weber’s embracing of a “criticistic formal ethic of responsibility,”
Schluchter asserts that we can find in Weber an ethical system appro-
priate to our modern epoch, as Kant offered for an earlier era.
The multiple dichotomous concepts and schematic typologies in this
chapter appear to me frequently strained, not least owing to the discon-
nectedness of Schluchter’s finer distinctions from Weber’s empirical soci-
ology. As Schluchter states, “One has to be willing to speculate regarding
Weber’s position” (p. 89). Moreover, the Weberian “value theory” recon-
structed here banishes, as unfortunate, all internal inconsistency and in-
completeness. The tension between concept and empirical reality, the dy-
namic conflict across concepts, the heroic (and often failed) effort to
address a social world perceived as exceedingly complex, and the ubiq-
uity of power, domination, and conflict—all these central features of We-
1735
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.18 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 23:23:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology
ber’s sociology are pushed aside. Instead, a static and highly abstract
ethical system is offered. Weber’s confrontations and struggles do not
play a role but only that which so often eluded Weber: the firm outcome.
Part 2, “Religion, Economy, and Politics: Max Weber’s Historical-
Sociological Profile,” reconstructs Weber’s sparse and fragmented com-
ments on Islam (chap. 3, “Hindrances to Modernity”) and his multiple
writings on Western Christianity (chap. 4, “The Emergence of Moder-
nity”). Far from treating these “world religions” alone, both chapters em-
phasize “ideal and material” constellations. In doing so, they seek to “con-
vey a relatively coherent picture of the Western trajectory from a
Weberian point of view” (p. 3). Schluchter sees “chains of circumstances”
and rejects forcefully the evolutionary positions of Hennis and Tenbruck.
In the context of a number of comparisons to Calvinism, chapter 3
first defines the religious ethic of Islam as “world mastery between world
conquest and world adjustment” (p. 121). Its “feudal or petty bourgeois
or booty capitalist” (p. 133) economic ethic was devoid of a thrust toward
an “economically rational mode of conduct” (p. 134). In addition, Islamic
feudalism erected strong obstacles to modern capitalism, the city never
attained corporate independence, and the “stereotyped ‘jurists’ law” of
Islam “prevented a logical systematization of law in terms of formal jurid-
ical concepts” (p. 164) as well as any subjection of domination to legal
constraints. Schluchter’s continuous comparisons to the medieval West
allow a clear demarcation of the various ways in which Islamic civiliza-
tion lacked the “structural heterogeneity and pluralism” (pp. 160, 164)
characteristic of the Occident. He brilliantly takes the “many pieces . . .
[or] historical prerequisites” and “[puts] the puzzle together” in order to
explain “why rational capitalism [never] ‘succeeded’ . . . in Islamic civili-
zation” (p. 166).
He then addresses directly the very different “individual constellation”
that accounts for the Western trajectory. While the Papal revolution of
the 11th and 12th centuries called forth a “relatively rational bureaucratic
institution” independent of political domination and paved the way for
“legislation by rational enactment,” the feudal revolution “created West-
ern knighthood, with its inner-worldly unified mode of conduct and the
idea of the contractual character of political power” (p. 218), and an urban
revolution “contributed to the development of the secular concept of the
corporation and the ‘birth’ of a particular urban citizenry” (p. 218). Each
of these spheres contained their own dynamic conflicts; their relative in-
dependence implied a structural heterogeneity and competition across
“principles of organization and legitimacy” (p. 222) singular to the West.
In addition, and not least, a “rational economic ethic” crystallized with
ascetic Protestantism.
With the exception of the treatment of the ways in which a rational
economic ethic arose from Calvinism (which remains quite abbreviated)
and the near-total omission of the central concepts of Verstehen and
meaningful action, this reconstruction is a powerful one that moves quali-
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tatively beyond Schluchter’s earlier attempts. It is unique in the litera-
ture.
This volume has been translated with great care by Neil Solomon. Al-
though the juxtaposition in one study of “political-philosophical” and
“historical-sociological” analyses prohibits clear thematic unity, Schlucht-
er’s refusal to simplify Weber’s project and his sovereignty over the full
range of Weber’s texts renders this volume indispensable to all today
interested in Max Weber. Historians of sociology in particular will find
Schluchter’s frequent discussions of historical and intellectual contexts
quite helpful. Moreover, the dual foci of Schluchter’s writings are clearly
evident: his concern to reconstruct Weber’s “theory of values” and analy-
sis of the rise of the West.
In my view, Schluchter’s interpretation omits fully the very core of
Weber’s achievement as a sociologist. He reads Weber either as a philoso-
pher or as an historian utilizing sociological concepts and pays little atten-
tion to Weber as a sociological theorist and rigorous comparative-
historical sociologist who undertakes substantive research by reference
to an array of demarcated causal strategies and procedures. The societal
orders (Lebensordnungen) and orientational models of Economy and So-
ciety, for example, which guide all of Weber’s empirical work, appear
prominently in Schluchter’s reconstructions, yet only in an ad hoc fash-
ion. He correctly insists that Weber rejects all closed causal models, yet
each of his chapters moves too far in the other direction: each starts from
scratch. While every chapter unravels masterfully a different deep reser-
voir of Weber’s knowledge, each takes a relevant summary statement by
Weber as its organizational framework rather than his mode of analysis,
or practiced methodology. Repeatedly, in this regard, Schluchter refers
alone to Weber’s most global organizing mechanisms, such as “ideas and
interests” or “chain of circumstances.” Would sociologists read this classic
today were he only an historical sociologist and theorist of ethical values?
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy. By Ju¨rgen Habermas. Translated by William Rehg.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996. Pp. xliii1631. $40.00.
Joachim J. Savelsberg
University of Minnesota
With this English translation, Faktizita¨t und Geltung becomes available
to a much larger readership. This is good, as Habermas tackles funda-
mental problems of modern constitutional states: from endangered social
solidarity to a loss of direction and self-confidence in politics. In a Hercu-
lean effort, Habermas attempts to provide the intellectual tools toward
understanding and solving them. In an age of completely secularized poli-
tics, he argues, the rule of law cannot be maintained without radical de-
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mocracy and a new and common understanding of what constitutes justi-
fied interests and equal treatment.
As William Rehg, masterful translator, states, this book constitutes the
“culminating effort” (p. ix) in a 30-year project. It resorts to philosophy
of law, legal theory, and sociology. Given “considerable demands on its
readers” (p. x), Rehg provides a length summary (pp. ix–xxxvii), and the
author, in a 1994 postscript, takes “the role of an interpreter and at-
tempt[s] to recapitulate the core idea that informs the whole book as he
sees it” (p. 447).
In the first two (of nine) chapters, Habermas introduces the category
of modern law in the context of his theory of communicative action. After
neither historicism nor philosophical anthropology were able to establish
practical reason, after Nietzsche denied it and systems theory erased it,
Habermas pleads for communicative reason as an alternative, ascribed
neither to macrosubjects nor individuals but to the socially integrative
force of noncoercive processes of reaching understanding. Discourse the-
ory, indebted to pragmatist thinking, leads to a proceduralist paradigm
of law. Communicative action uses the rationality potential of language
for social integration, and modern law fills gaps in social orders whose
integrative capacities have been overtaxed (law no longer colonizes).
Habermas, while building on Kant, challenges Kant’s subordination
of law to morality for pluralist societies that lack normative consensus.
This critique also applies to Rawlsian moves toward social contract tradi-
tions of rational natural law. Luhmann’s systems theory on the other
hand completely separates law from morality. Against both sides, Ha-
bermas builds on Weber and Parsons, and, through their critique, estab-
lishes the socially integrative meaning of legal communication.
Chapters 3 and 4 are dedicated to the philosophy of law, the former
to clarify the relationship between law and morality, the latter that be-
tween law and politics. Again, Habermas claims middle ground between
the liberal tradition a` la Locke and civic republicanism from Plato to
Rousseau: both private and public autonomy are basic for the functioning
of democracy. In dealing with the role of state authority, Habermas links
informal discursive sources of democracy with formal decision-making
institutions. Law transforms communicative power into administrative
power.
Habermas applies his philosophical design to current issues of legal
theory in Germany and the United States, focusing on the tension be-
tween conformity to statutes and precedent versus rightness in terms of
moral standards in judicial decision making and on the role of constitu-
tional courts (chaps. 5–6). He proceeds to address sociological challenges
to the application of normative theory. Chapter 7 outlines a model of
deliberative democracy, and chapter 8 considers challenges of social
power and systemic complexity. Chapter 9 provides a defense of a proce-
duralist paradigm of law in an attempt to bring legal and social theory
together.
In his discussion of political sociology, Habermas rather bluntly sum-
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marizes empirical findings as though instrumentalization of the political
process and the role of expert knowledge in administrative-political con-
trol did indeed severely damage legitimate democratic rule. His examples
for participation in deliberative democracy are unfortunately limited to
groups with “good” causes. Theoretically, Habermas argues mostly with
rational choice and systems theorists. The absence of other, especially
network, literature as a reference point is astonishing. Habermas holds
against “empiricist” approaches that they do not incorporate the norma-
tive foundation of a theory of democracy, a deficiency that his discourse-
theory-based model of deliberative democracy is supposed to overcome.
The book is of burning interest to all who are concerned with basic
challenges to modern law and democracy. Readers who master the chal-
lenge will gain enormously. Yet, many will not be convinced of the incor-
poration of normative judgments into an analytical theory. And, while
Habermas does confront his theory with institutional reality, the com-
plete lack of reference to any articles in the leading German or American
sociology journals is a disturbing indicator. Sociologists know that even
most carefully deduced, logically consistent, and convincing theories of-
ten flounder in the light of empirical evidence. Further, assumptions re-
garding the exclusively strategic character of economic and bureaucratic
action or the complete lack of moral consensus in pluralist societies (even
at a high level of abstraction), reveal risks of mistaking ideal types for
empirical reality. And what about empirical consequences of participa-
tory versus bureaucratized modes of decision making and actual implica-
tions of technocratization for legitimacy? Incorporating more insights
provided by theoretically guided empirical social science would help to-
ward theoretical and operational specification. Such intermediate steps
are needed to bridge the gap between abstract deductive theory and prac-
tical solutions to problems of legal order and democracy. If Habermas
does not do it, maybe others will. His challenge certainly deserves it.
Michel de Certeau: Interpretation and Its Other. By Jeremy Ahearne.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995. Pp. ix1227. $45.00
(cloth); $16.95 (paper).
Jack Katz
University of California, Los Angeles
I can only read Michel de Certeau with the interests of a research sociolo-
gist, who must ground observations about society in descriptions of peo-
ple acting with reference to others in particular times and places. From
that perspective, it is easy to dismiss him. His texts, full of statements of
abstractions affecting abstractions, frustrate a research sociologist’s de-
sire to visualize what confirming or disconfirming evidence would look
like. He has religious preoccupations with Catholic mysticism that show
up in how he wrote and what he argues. And he is not the rage anywhere.
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His work dates from the 1970s and now, about 10 years after his death
and the English publication of The Practice of Everyday Life (University
of California, 1984), the attention paid him runs primarily in small cor-
ners of cultural studies, French thought, and the history of ideas.
That is unfortunate, and Jeremy Ahearne’s thorough and carefully
crafted little book helps show why, even though it is not directed at soci-
ologists. De Certeau wrote primarily about historiography, about various
episodes of the interpretation and domination of folk cultures and folk
spiritualism over several centuries in France, and about contemporary
practices of everyday life. Throughout, he focuses on political, intellec-
tual, and cultural efforts to define, and, in one sense or another, to sup-
press, phenomena that exist outside of a politically and economically ra-
tionalized social order. He is fascinated with a 16th-century text written
about Brazil’s Tupinambou people by a Frenchman who was stranded
with them for three months. He dwells on the prosecutions of nuns pos-
sessed by the devil in 17th-century Loudun. He examines the Abbe´ Gre´-
goire’s efforts to “annihilate” regional patois. With Dominique Julia and
Jacques Revel, he sees censorship in the Second Empire as the beginnings
of a “castrating cult” that sought to undermine popular culture by idealiz-
ing it. And he considers the cunning, often devious, ways that people
read, shop, and get around in cities today.
Lest this focus be dismissed as familiar, Ahearne makes clear that, in
distinction from Foucault, de Certeau wants to bring out the survival,
usually in a very distorted form, of what the disciplinary apparatus has
tried to suppress. Thus the folk anthropological description of the Tupi-
nambou not only set them up for Western manipulation, it also recog-
nized and preserved their “otherness” in an “eroticism” of abiding fascina-
tion. The possessed of Loudun resisted their inquisitors with confessions
that were so extensive, they became devices for maintaining the impene-
trability of their spiritual world. The very effort to suppress regional af-
filiations has given surprisingly persistent life to efforts that resist na-
tional homogenization. And the rationalized maps and professionalized
advertising of contemporary life is treated by a city’s residents as the
background for shortcuts, “poachings,” and endlessly innovative brico-
lage work.
Reading de Certeau is an experience of alternating repulsion and fasci-
nation. I do not think that is accidental. De Certeau recreates for the
reader both the relationship he had to his materials and the relationships
of overt revulsion/suppression and secret attraction/nourishment that he
tries to document in various historical settings. Just as one is ready to
throw one of his texts aside in disgust, some damnably indispensable line
of inquiry suddenly breaks through. Thus, in reading his treatment of
17th-century witch trials, it is easy to long for the eminently accessible
prose of Kai Erikson’s (Wayward Puritans [Wiley, 1966]) treatment of a
Puritan prosecution, but then one starts to appreciate that something
worth special note was going on when one of the possessed managed to
trouble the exorcists by claiming that she had forgotten her name, per-
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haps lost it in the wash, or by confessing without pause, “I am Behemoth.
I am Dog’s Dick. I am Iscaron.” Why, after all, did these localized out-
breaks of religious fervor become so important to the state? De Certeau
suggests that the possessed of Loudun were challenging what was becom-
ing essential to the project of nation and power building, a certain version
of personal identity and subjectivity, one that insists on a single, singular,
and publicly known definition of self.
But he will not take us any farther than this tantalizing suggestion. It
was de Certeau’s choice to hover around the openings to the new lines
of empirical inquiry he was designating. Whenever he stepped through
to begin describing social life in an easily recognizable form, he would
quickly step back to scout the boundaries between the conventionally
visible and that which must persist secretly.
For social research, the most immediate payoff of his work is its begin-
ning of a social phenomenology of everyday life. Here he leaves touches
of substantive contribution, for example, in the appreciation of the archi-
pelago pattern in the informal mapmaking efforts of city dwellers and in
noting the synecdochic character of perception as one passes through a
city’s streets. Raised to his broader level of social theorizing, de Certeau
might reflect on why it is so hard to keep in mind that such cartoonlike
maps are not just funny New Yorker covers but the real thing and that
the real joke is the assumption that official maps are not fictions.
In cultural sociology, de Certeau would shift attentions to the tactical
ways that people move between what are formally designated and usually
studied as different domains (the marketplace, elections, work settings,
sports arenas, family life). In their interinstitutional, intertextual move-
ments, people constantly create a kind of silent social world, or, more
accurately, a social world that is well known and indirectly addressed in
folk terms but that remains beyond conventional attentions, including
those of sociological research. With his emphasis on people’s everyday
tactics, de Certeau cuts against the overly abstract and passive character
of much of his writing and points us clearly toward a rich research path.
Max Weber and Democratic Politics. By Peter Breiner. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi1237. $39.95.
Robert J. Antonio
University of Kansas
Post–World War II readings of Weber identified him with liberal democ-
racy. In 1959, however, Wolfgang J. Mommsen began an intense debate
over Weber and democracy with his controversial treatise about Weber’s
nationalism and about how his ideas of bureaucratic domination, rational-
legality, and plebiscitary leadership paved the way for Carl Schmitt’s pro-
tofascism. But not until the 1970s did numerous English language works
probe the different sides and ambiguities of Weber’s political thought.
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Because few of these studies have addressed closely the issue of Weber
and direct democracy, however, Peter Breiner’s exploration of the topic
fills a distinctive niche in the Weber discourse.
Although holding that Weber’s ideas of bureaucracy, legitimacy, and
leadership truncate the possibilities of modern democracy, Breiner also
contends that he offered vital resources for vindicating the ideal of direct
democracy. In his view, Weber provided essential tools for “sociologically
informed political theorizing and political practice” (p. 78; emphasis
mine), contributing substantially to a broad stream of thought stressing
“political prudence” or “political knowledge as situation-bound advice on
the means, ends, and logics of action” faced regularly by political actors
(p. 2). Emphasizing the “consequentialist” strand of this tradition (e.g.,
Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Gramsci), Breiner argues that Weber rec-
ognized the “paradoxical” relations between political aspirations and
practices. Because political actions transform the very context in which
they are first framed, unintended consequences are unavoidable, and all
political prescriptions must be treated as tentative. By analyzing norma-
tive ends in their sociohistorical contexts and embracing uncertainty, We-
ber’s practical judgment escapes the formalism of purely normative argu-
ments, transcendental claims about unchanging truths, and totalistic
theories of history.
Breiner implies that Weber’s perspectivist emphasis on the formative
impact of values on knowledge, ideal-type method of analyzing the poten-
tial consequences of different means-ends schemes in divergent historical
contexts, and keen sensibility about everpresent, unexpected factors con-
stitute a peak in the prudential tradition. In his view, Weber counters
the tendency of elitist and radical theories of democracy to split ends from
means and intrinsic from instrumental concerns. Thus, Breiner sheds en-
tirely different light on Weber’s purposive rationality than the critiques
of his instrumentalism (e.g., by Marcuse, Habermas, Alexander). To illus-
trate Weber’s prudence, Breiner elaborates his critique of marginal utility
theory (i.e., stressing its ahistorical presuppositions, lack of attention to
context, and underappreciation of unintended consequences). This chap-
ter not only demonstrates Weber’s broader approach but explains nicely
his view of neoclassical political economy and still instructive vision of
an alternative social economics.
By contrast to Weber’s contextual, multicausal, contingent critique of
economics, Breiner argues, he invoked objectivistic, singular, irreversible
processes and conditions against political positions he opposed. Breiner
contends that Weber’s claims about bureaucratic rationalization and pas-
sive citizenry constrict democratic possibilities to mass plebiscitary poli-
tics and lead directly to the conclusion that participatory democracy is
an irresponsible pipe dream. However, Breiner also employs Weber’s
prudence to criticize Rousseauian radical democrats, implying that they
too need to accept the inherent uncertainty of political action and respon-
sibility for its unintended as well as intended consequences. Breiner be-
lieves that participatory institutions are feasible if they are seen as a radi-
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calizing addition rather than as a substitute for administration and
representative politics. But to fit instrumental means to political ends and
avert idealistic flights from reality, even this more modest vision of radi-
cal democracy must come to terms with the paradoxical split between
aspirations and consequences.
Two critical points are in order. First, Breiner draws heavily from We-
ber’s methodology, ideal-types, and ethics of politics. Yet, Weber details
the tensions, countervailing forces, and unintended consequences that
create free spaces, openings, and possibilities for substantive democrati-
zation in his historical discussions. Although concurring with the general
thrust of Breiner’s critique, I believe that his mode of argument exagger-
ates somewhat the coherence and narrowness of Weber’s views about
democracy. Second, his reading of Weber and view of radical democracy
have affinities for John Dewey’s instrumentalism, experimentalism, and
uncertainty and the idea of active publics enlivening representative poli-
tics. Dewey took seriously the doubts of pessimistic liberals, like Walter
Lippmann and Weber, about the masses’ capability and willingness to
bear the weight of political responsibility. Their questions are no less
pressing today. Although Dewey provided no final answers, he stressed
the enormity of the cultural project entailed in radical democratic hopes
about creating participatory institutions within mass democracy. Brein-
er’s argument would have been stronger if he addressed this non-Rous-
seauian branch of radical democratic theory and other side of prudence.
This short review understates the complexity and subtlety of Breiner’s
dense, nuanced argument. His book is a serious contribution that should
be read by Weber scholars and others concerned with democratic theory.
Moreover, Breiner’s position will be of interest to those troubled by the
abstract tendencies of contemporary theory. His vision of Weber’s socio-
logically informed political prudence offers an alternative method to
quasi-transcendental and deontological theories (e.g., Habermas and
Rawls) that privilege normative over instrumental matters and to mod-
ernist and postmodernist approaches that substitute textual criticism and
exegesis for historical engagement. This theme alone makes Breiner’s
work worth reading.
Muslim Politics. By Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. xi1240. $39.50 (cloth); $13.95
(paper).
Lisa Wedeen
Wesleyan University
This book challenges the still-current notion that political movements in-
spired by contemporary experiences of Islam are monolithic and immuta-
ble. The authors apply the term “Muslim politics” to a variety of regional
and transnational contexts within which contests over political institu-
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tions and over systems of signification take place. These movements are
specifically Muslim because they “relate to a widely shared, although not
doctrinally defined, tradition of ideas and practice,” which Muslims in
“different contexts identify as ‘Islamic’ to support their claims and coun-
terclaims” (p. 4). The authors explain the appeal of “Muslim politics” to
diverse classes, and especially among educated young people, as the result
of widespread discontent and uncertainty following economic restruc-
turing.
One of the book’s helpful interventions is in the chapter on “Muslim
Politics: A Changing Political Geography,” in which the authors use the
insights of anthropologist Arjun Appadurai to rethink the effects of tech-
nological innovations and global transformations on attachments to and
identifications with territory. Ethnicity and religious activism have be-
come, to use Appadurai’s word, “deterritorialized,” so that Muslim activ-
ists from different nation-states might identify as much, if not more, with
each other than with fellow citizens (p. 136). But as the authors also point
out, “deterritorialization has its limits” (p. 153). Nonstate Islamic organi-
zations may help to advertise issues to a transnational Muslim commu-
nity, but the increasing permeability of national frontiers in the age of
globalized communications and migrations does not seem, in most cases,
to undermine the primacy of the nation-state. Many Islamic activists use
transnational linkages to challenge the limits of state authority, but they
tend to imagine remaking their world within the confines of existing terri-
torial arrangements.
The book also makes accessible the important conclusions of promi-
nent theorists of Islamic law and history who argue against persistent
popular readings of Islamic religion and politics as fundamentally insepa-
rable. Instead of conflating Islamic doctrine with actual practices, chapter
3, “Sacred Authority in Contemporary Muslim Societies,” makes a histori-
cal argument, maintaining that divisions between religious and secular
authority were already evident not long after the Prophet Muhammad’s
death. The authors’ sensitivity to the context-dependent relationship be-
tween political and religious concerns will also help a general audience
grasp the ways in which political groups might interpret, appropriate,
and manipulate religious language and symbolism.
The authors make a valuable attempt to show that politics is not
merely about material interests but also about contests over the symbolic
world, over the signification of signs and symbols and the representation
of events, conditions, and people. The book thus counters the tendency
of conventional studies in political science to view politics as basically a
matter of material interests and the groups articulating them. For stu-
dents of symbolic politics, however, such observations, although always
welcome, are unlikely to be perceived as startling or new. And for many
political scientists, the absence of a thorough, systematic analysis of how
symbols operate, how they mediate, structure, define, sustain, and contin-
ually reassert political obedience, for example, probably leaves the au-
thors’ assertions of symbolism’s centrality to political life unconvincing.
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The book provides a wealth of information and is ambitious in its
scope, in the number of examples selected for study, in the eclectic review
of literature across academic disciplines, and in the promises of concep-
tual clarity it makes. The book’s efforts to question rigid dichotomies,
such as between public and private, are successful if not novel, but its
goal of clarifying concepts such as tradition, authority, resistance, and
ethnicity remains unrealized. The discussion of ethnicity, for instance,
may work as a helpful corrective to formulations of identity that posit
ethnicities as fixed, natural, and essential, but such descriptions are in no
way specific to Islam, nor is it clear from the arguments presented here
how constructions of ethnicity and of Islam interact to produce specific
constellations of political power. Despite these shortcomings and a some-
times convoluted style, the book is a positive addition to a growing body
of scholarship seeking to interrogate popular assumptions about Muslims.
Comparing Policy Networks: Labor Politics in the U.S., Germany, and
Japan. By David Knoke, Franz Urban Pappi, Jeffrey Broadbent, and
Yutaka Tsujinaka. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp.
xiv1288. $54.95 (cloth); $17.95 (paper).
Roger V. Gould
University of Chicago
Inasmuch as a chief strength of network imagery is its abstraction, it
would have been natural to expect a steady flow of serious comparative
studies employing network methodology as their principal tool. Oddly,
many practitioners, having noticed how amenable most data are to trans-
lation into network terms, have instead devoted their energies to repre-
senting idiosyncratic, not to say trivial, social systems as networks: Ham
radio clubs, association football matches, and communities of macaques
are about as likely to attract the network analyst’s attention as are labor
markets, political patronage systems, and international trade flows.
Fortunately, the authors of Comparing Policy Networks have taken it
upon themselves to demonstrate the power of abstract structural imagery
in studying a topic that is both significant for social science and conducive
to comparative research: national-level arenas for labor policy decision
making in advanced capitalist societies. The book’s premise is simple:
Given the many differences among nation-states in the types of political
actors that matter, the rules they must follow, and the way they choose
to operate, a coherent analytical framework capable of encompassing a
variety of national “policy domains” is indispensable for making compari-
sons. Knoke et al.’s main aim in this book is to show that what they
term “the organizational state perspective,” an approach that centers on
network representations of interest overlap, communication, and coordi-
nation among highly visible public and private organizations, is a strong
candidate for cross-national comparative research in political economy.
1745
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.18 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 23:23:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology
The perspective, originally presented in an earlier study of three policy
domains in the United States (Edward O. Laumann and David Knoke,
The Organizational State [University of Wisconsin Press, 1987]), relies
principally on multidimensional scaling of information and political sup-
port relations among organizational actors. The goal is to render the
chaos of lobbying, logrolling, and arm-twisting among policy actors com-
prehensible by mapping thousands of organizational contacts into two-
and three-dimensional space.
In a series of detailed and data-laden chapters, the authors demonstrate
that it is indeed possible to portray three national polities in commensura-
ble terms—that is, in terms abstract enough to accommodate all three
cases, but not so broad that differences disappear. Overall, the authors
find that their data and analyses confirm the conventional wisdom that
Japan and Germany are more corporatist than the United States, in the
sense that, in the first two nations, peak labor organizations seem to com-
municate with employer organizations through the mediation of public
authorities, whereas in the United States, communication on labor issues
is more polarized and contentious.
The authors draw many other, more fine-grained conclusions from
their data, but there is a recurring problem in deciding what they mean.
The problem is that existing views of state-society relations are imprecise
to begin with and in any case have not been framed in the terms used
in this study. Knoke et al. do some of the work of translating conventional
wisdom into “organizational state” terms, but they do this loosely. For
example, the general perception in the literature that Japan’s polity is
more dependent than that of the United States or Germany on informal
communication motivates the authors’ prediction that communication
networks there will be both denser and more centralized than in the other
two countries. Yet one could easily imagine arguing that a polity more
dependent on informal, behind-the-scenes contact would exhibit less cen-
tralized networks (indeed, at the extremes, high centralization and high
density are logically incompatible). This slack between theoretical propo-
sitions and their operational counterparts makes it difficult to know when
to be surprised by the findings and when not to; and, given that there are
some surprises, whether to view them as evidence against conventional
wisdom, or evidence that the data collection and analysis procedures the
authors employ need refinement. This difficulty is endemic to research
areas in which alternative methodologies compete; to the degree that
one’s confidence in a method is measured in terms of established knowl-
edge, one is unlikely to accept divergent findings as new knowledge.
The book’s last two empirical chapters, the first of which tests a model
of policy-making inspired by Coleman’s rational-actor framework, and
the second of which applies blockmodel analysis to the three information-
exchange networks, are specifically intended to move past the issue of
descriptive validity to questions about how policy issues are decided,
and—even more generally—how “the underlying power structures of the
three labor policy domains” (p. 201) differ. There is some evidence that
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taking account of communication patterns helps to predict policy out-
comes, but the improvement in fit over a model that merely counts actor
preferences is slight enough that even the authors are wary about making
strong claims. Similarly, the blockmodels of communication patterns are
as sensitive to noise as they are to meaningful patterns, making the
reduced-form images they generate very difficult to interpret. The find-
ings that inspire confidence are thus, again, those about which there will
be little debate. Social scientists interested in the state may be disap-
pointed after wading through this chapter to read that the central conclu-
sion is “public actors [i.e., state authorities] play a very important role in
all three domains” (p. 208).
Cross-national studies on this scale, using a unified research instrument
carefully designed to take account of cultural and linguistic differences
among respondents, are difficult and correspondingly rare. For this rea-
son alone, Comparing Policy Networks is a noteworthy piece of work.
Further exploration of the data, using conceptual language of the sort
the authors advocate, will very likely make a major contribution to the
political economy literature.
Suburbs under Siege: Race, Space and Audacious Judges. By Charles M.
Haar. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp. xiv1266.
Our Town: Race, Housing, and the Soul of Suburbia. By David L. Kirp,
John P. Dwyer, and Larry A. Rosenthal. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press, 1995. Pp. x1267.
John R. Logan
State University of New York at Albany
Exclusionary zoning in the suburbs illustrates the determined use of pub-
lic policy to influence future growth, a key element of nonecological theo-
ries of community development. It has also proven to be a hotly contested
battleground. Arrayed on one side are residents and officials of a select
set of suburbs that restrict or exclude construction of apartments or even
single-family houses on the usual quarter- or third-acre plot (though they
may well promote industrial parks or shopping malls, and they may also
tolerate high growth rates for houses on larger lots). On the other are a
motley array of builders (seeking profits from higher density projects) and
fair housing organizations (promoting opportunities for minorities). Rep-
resentatives of central cities and minority membership organizations play
a more ambivalent role, typically condemning exclusionary practices but
also aware that suburban exclusion reinforces their own political base in
urban centers.
The state of New Jersey has offered a stunning window on this battle
since 1971, when local advocates began a challenge against the small
semirural town of Mount Laurel. Now, 20 years after the New Jersey
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Supreme Court issued its first rulings in the Mount Laurel case (in 1976),
two books offer a chronicle and evaluation of the process that established
a legal mandate for the economic integration of suburbia. They will be
of special interest to sociologists in the fields of urbanization, race rela-
tions, and law, though the substantive issues raised here transcend these
specialty areas.
Each book focuses on a different aspect of the story. Charles Haar
(Suburbs under Siege) is a legal scholar and longtime advocate for judicial
intervention against exclusionary practices. He depicts the Mount Laurel
saga as evidence that judicial activism can be successful. A courageous,
skillful court can and should stand up against recalcitrant localities and
a reluctant legislature to protect poor and minority citizens who have not
mobilized effectively on their own behalf. As a result of the New Jersey
court’s intervention, he argues, 15,400 affordable housing units were built
in the suburbs, with the prospect of at least 54,000 more due to rezoning.
“Behavior has changed in suburban municipalities” (p. 131). Haar’s view
is based on his own experience as a special master (i.e., a specially selected
mediator for individual cases), interviews with judges, lawyers, and oth-
ers, and a close reading of the long series of court decisions. He carefully
analyzes these decisions in terms of the strategic choices made by their
authors: how to retain jurisdiction within the state courts and to defend
against later legislative challenges, how to facilitate enforcement, when
and to what degree to back down. The second Mount Laurel decision
(1983) took unusually strong steps. It mandated the use of statewide plan-
ning standards to fix numerical targets for providing lower income hous-
ing in every municipality; it offered individual builders specific remedies
that encouraged them to sue local governments; and it established a spe-
cial judicial system to accelerate adjudication. Haar’s interviews with the
three judges designated to implement this scheme (and many of the spe-
cial masters that they selected) provide a unique and detailed description
of this implementation process.
Our Town, by Kirp, Dwyer, and Rosenthal, focuses less on the legal
decisions and more on the political process within which they were
forged. This account looks more closely at the local situation from which
the Mount Laurel case emerged, including the tensions within the
Springville Action Council that first proposed low-income housing in the
town, the roles played by local Democratic and Republican politicians,
and the backgrounds of the Legal Services attorneys who filed suit. It
also digs more deeply into statewide politics. At this level, contradicting
Haar’s thesis, these authors depict the second Mount Laurel decision as
overreaching the real power of the courts. The consequence of aggressive
action, they argue, was an intense reaction by the legislature. The state’s
Fair Housing Act (1985) accepted the constitutional principle that sub-
urbs must be responsive to regional housing needs. But it imposed new
upper limits on the number of affordable units that a municipality could
be required to provide, it transferred authority for implementing the law
from the courts to a new state agency, and it allowed suburbs to “buy
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off” up to half their fair share of affordable housing by negotiating to
provide the housing in central cities instead. This was “a blunt message
to the high court: get out of exclusionary zoning” (p. 137). When the law
was challenged by housing advocates, it was unclear how the court would
respond to this watering down of its mandates. The legislative reconfir-
mation of Chief Justice Wilentz himself hung in the balance. As a result,
in Mount Laurel III (1986) “the Supreme Court capitulated” (p. 137).
Compared to Haar’s praise of judicial activism, Kirp, Dwyer and Rosen-
thal believe that ground-breaking decisions can be sustained only in un-
usual conditions, when powerful allies can be enlisted. In this case, the
federal courts, the governor, and the legislature were opponents, and nei-
ther central city politicians nor statewide minority groups offered much
support.
Whether the glass of judicial activism is half full or half empty de-
pends, then, on one’s vantage point. Haar convincingly states the moral
case for the obligation of the courts to protect minority rights and identi-
fies strategies for more effective intervention. Kirp, Dwyer, and Rosenthal
offer a broader understanding of the political context of the law. On a
question so central to our times, and in the context of national struggles
over affirmative action, legislative redistricting, and other hot issues, both
books are important additions to our thinking.
Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. By Donald R.
Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996. Pp. xi1391. $27.50.
David Harris
University of Michigan
There is little doubt that black and white Americans hold dissimilar
views on policy issues. What is less certain is why this disparity exists.
The search for such an understanding drives Divided by Color. The book
begins by documenting the gap in black-white public opinion. It focuses
on support for six racial policies: (1) government action to ensure fair
treatment in jobs, (2) government efforts to ensure school integration, (3)
increased federal funding for programs that assist blacks, (4) government
initiatives to improve the economic and social position of blacks, (5) hir-
ing and promotion preferences for blacks, and (6) reserved positions for
blacks at colleges and universities. Racial differences across these items
are staggering. On a 10-point scale of support for racial programs, 63%
of blacks but just 9% of whites fall into the three most liberal categories
of the scale. This discrepancy is much larger than gender differences on
gender issues or class differences on class issues.
What explains the disparity? Kinder and Sanders consider three expla-
nations. First, they test whether self-interest accounts for racial differ-
ences. Self-interested citizens are those individuals who “pursue material
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benefits and harms in politics, and [who] have in mind only themselves
and their immediate families” (p. 52). The data shows little evidence that
self-interest is an important factor. However, when the focus is broad-
ened to group interest, the effects are stronger. Blacks and whites are not
as concerned with how a policy will impact their own families as they
are with how it will affect their racial group. Despite these findings,
Kinder and Sanders remain skeptical about the role of interests because
their data reveal that whites’ racial sentiments are an important predictor
of their perception of the threat blacks pose. As such, interests are likely
a proxy for racial attitudes rather than evidence that whites are con-
cerned about real threats and advantages.
Second, Kinder and Sanders examine the role of group animosities. In
response to the decline of biological racism and simultaneous rise of racial
code words, they offer racial resentment as a new measure of whites’
distaste for blacks. Racial resentment, a concept that differs little from
symbolic racism, “features indignation as a central emotional theme” and
is “the conjunction of whites’ feelings toward blacks and their support
for American values” (p. 293). Racial resentment is measured by six items
that are designed to subtly ascertain whites’ views about blacks. The
resulting composite indicator is internally consistent, stable, correlated
with racial stereotypes, and distinct from biological racism. Most impor-
tant, it is a strong predictor of white support for racial policies. When
whites judge programs designed to help blacks, they apparently take it
as an opportunity to express racial antipathies.
A third potential determinant of public opinion is principles. This argu-
ment holds that there is a black-white gap not because of self-interest,
group interest, or racial resentment but rather because of differential sub-
scription to core American values. Specifically, Kinder and Sanders eval-
uate the impact of beliefs about equality, economic individualism, and
limited government. Of the three, only economic individualism consis-
tently shows no effect. Beliefs in equality and limited government both
significantly predict support for racial policies, though each is a less im-
portant factor than racial resentment.
Finally, Kinder and Sanders examine the role elites and the media play
in framing issues. They divide their sample into panels and present each
with modified versions of the original public opinion questions. This exer-
cise shows that how an issue is framed dramatically affects whether racial
resentment, self-interest, or principle is activated. As an additional test
of framing, Kinder and Sanders take advantage of the fact that Willie
Horton, a black convicted murderer and rapist, became an image in the
1988 presidential campaigns while they were collecting their data. This
natural experiment confirms the importance of frames. Whites inter-
viewed before the Horton ads appeared on television were less sensitive
to racial resentment than were whites queried later. The lesson of these
experiments is that elites and the press have power to affect public opin-
ion and, indirectly, policy by adopting one frame over another.
Kinder and Sanders present a thorough, thoughtful, and compelling
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explanation of why black and white Americans view the political land-
scape so differently. While there is no doubt that this book should be
read by all who attempt to understand the role of race in our society, it
is not without problems. First, the discussion has a tendency to overinter-
pret the effects of racial resentment and downplay the importance of
other factors. While racial resentment clearly plays the largest role in de-
termining public opinion, belief in limited government and equality regu-
larly exhibit effects that are at least half as large as those for racial resent-
ment. Second, it is not clear that the racial resentment scale measures
racial resentment. An alternative interpretation is that it indicates
whether people are racial structuralists (i.e., they believe that blacks face
greater obstacles to success). Unlike racial resentment, racial structural-
ism is a theoretically valid explanation for white and black public opin-
ion. Also, because it is composed of prejudices and information, one’s
belief in racial structuralism is susceptible to interventions. Whether ra-
cial structuralism or racial resentment better explains the black-white gap
in public opinion should be the focus of future research and discussion, as
the two frames have differing implications for race relations and policy.
The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Iden-
tity. By Ge´rard Noiriel. Translated by Geoffroy de Laforcade. Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. Pp. xxix1325. $22.95 (paper).
Jeremy Hein
University of Wisconsin—Eau Claire
In The French Melting Pot, Ge´rard Noiriel does for immigrants in France
what Eugene Weber did for French regionalism: establish the existence
and longevity of diversity in a country portrayed as the paradigm of the
assimilationist nation-state. The original publication of The French Melt-
ing Pot in 1988 was therefore an event for France akin to the publication
of Beyond the Melting Pot (N. Glazer and D. Moynihan [MIT Press,
1963]) for the United States. Glazer and Moynihan announced that the
United States was not an amalgamation of cultures but a segmented hier-
archy composed of competing religious, ethnic, and racial groups. Noiriel
does not go this far in his characterization of France. But in the French
context, his thesis is equally profound and, for some, almost heretical.
Noiriel argues that France is not a monolithic national culture that ab-
sorbs newcomers but an evolving blend of peoples.
Citing the well-publicized statistic that about one in five inhabitants
of France has an immigrant parent or grandparent, Noiriel asks why
contemporary foreigners (who account for only about 7% of the popula-
tion) are thought to be such a novel experience for the country. This
anomaly serves as the springboard for an even deeper question: how
could a nation with 100 years of immigration history have a national
identity myth devoid of immigrants? The main culprit is the social sci-
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ences. By failing to study immigrants, French historians have perpetu-
ated a collective amnesia about the role of immigration in the formation
of modern France. The late Fernand Braudel comes in for particular crit-
icism. Braudel’s magnum opus, The Identity of France (HarperCollins,
1990), portrays French national identity as essentially complete by the
late 1600s. This longue dure´e approach to history marginalizes the more
than 2 million immigrants who settled in France between the 1880s and
1930s.
French sociologists also share some blame. Durkheim regarded immi-
gration as too plebeian a topic for true scientific inquiry. Nonetheless,
Noiriel credits French sociology as the first social science to seriously re-
search immigration, but that did not occur until the 1960s. Once begun,
competitive research centers balkanized the study of immigrants, dimin-
ishing the impact of findings on other social scientists and public opinion.
After explaining the absence of immigrants from French collective
memory, Noiriel spends several chapters reinterpreting the French expe-
rience with immigration largely through a rhetorical comparison with the
United States. Focusing on the Belgians, Italians, Poles, and Spaniards
who arrived during the early 1900s, Noiriel shows that these immigrants
contributed to French culture, politics, demographic growth, and agricul-
tural and industrialization productivity. He does not dispute that the de-
scendants of these immigrants became French, but he persuasively insists
that the French nation-state never assimilates immigrants; au contraire,
it is the immigrants who assimilate the ways of France.
American social scientists will find Noiriel’s comparative allusions of
interest if for no other reason than that he turns the tables. Rather than
the United States being the model melting pot, he suggests that France
has much to teach the United States. This shift in perspective is re-
freshing, but the comparison is more heuristic than analytic. Noiriel
draws a general distinction between countries populated by immigration
and those where immigration occurred after the development of a central-
ized state and industrialization. But he goes on to suggest that the cultural
integration of European immigrants proceeded in similar ways in France
and the United States. References to the relevant American literature,
however, are too superficial to substantiate this argument (e.g., there are
no citations of articles in the Journal of American Ethnic History).
While the U.S.-France comparison remains conjectural, The French
Melting Pot succeeds brilliantly in putting contemporary French discord
over immigrants in a historical context: immigrants, their contributions,
their social problems, and nativist reactions have a history of more than
100 years. The current national identity “crisis” is due to amnesia of this
past and a national myth that excludes immigrants. Lest American read-
ers think Noiriel has had the last word in the debate, it is important to
note other perspectives. Some cite the collapse of national institutions
that once integrated newcomers as the source of the crisis. Others (includ-
ing Braudel) argue that the institutionalization of Islam via North Afri-
can immigrants and funding from the Middle East has in fact introduced
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a new pluralism to France (civilization in Braudel’s terms). This debate
is far from over, and those in it will have to question long-held assump-
tions about the French nation-state as a result of Noiriel’s book.
The Racialisation of British Policing. By Simon Holdaway. New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Pp. ix1226. $49.95.
Vernetta D. Young
Howard University
There have been numerous studies on the relations between the police
and minorities, namely African-Americans and Hispanics, in the United
States. These studies have examined public opinion about the police, po-
lice behavior and discrimination, citizen complaints against the police,
and employment practices. This book covers each of these issues. Holda-
way, an ex–police officer, sets out to provide an “introduction to the socio-
logical study of relations between police and minority ethnic groups” (p.
vii) in Great Britain. Although Afro-Caribbeans and Asians are identified
as the primary minority groups, information is presented on Chinese,
Vietnamese, Chileans, and Jewish people. Still, most of the discussion
centers on Afro-Caribbeans.
Holdaway, in the chapter “Thinking about ‘Race,’ ” argues that it is
more appropriate to talk about racialized relations than race relations.
For Holdaway, the meaning of race is negotiated as a result of human
actions. Structural variables, such as immigration, occupation, income,
and gender, as well as social context determine the salience of race. He
argues that racialized relations in England can only be explained by look-
ing at the history of immigration and the exclusionary practices used to
maintain inequality. These factors influence how minorities experience
crime and victimization and set the stage for the discussion of the raciali-
zation of policing. Holdaway identifies a number of key areas of policing
or “sites of racialisation”: victimization, racial attacks and harassment,
the race and crime debate, riots, race relations within the police, and
reform of the police.
In chapter 2, Holdaway provides a historical context for racialized rela-
tions between the police and minority groups in Britain. He reports that
during the 1940s and 1950s Caribbean and Asian migrants, without work
skills or capital, moved into urban areas that already exhibited high crime
rates. Faced with inequality in employment and housing and with social
exclusion, they were forced to remain in these high crime areas.
Holdaway reports that Afro-Caribbeans and Asians perceive crime as
a significant problem and have higher rates of victimization than whites.
The police, however, provide inadequate attention to the concerns of mi-
nority groups largely due to stereotypical characterizations of these
groups and the areas in which they live. He argues that notions of “race”
are ingrained in police policies, practices, ideas, beliefs, and actions. Hol-
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daway seems to be offering an apology for the failure of the police to
understand and address the complex nature of these relations. He further
notes that for minorities these experiences are compounded because they
are not permitted to escape the situation due to structural and social con-
straints.
The occurrence of racial attacks and harassment is used to further em-
phasize the consequences of the exclusion and marginalization of minor-
ity ethnic groups—the racialization. According to Holdaway, these acts
pose an immediate physical and mental harm, but just as important, they
pose a “challenge to the right of ethnic minorities to live in Britain” (p.
46). Many incidents are not reported because citizens feel they will not
be taken seriously and that the police will not protect them. The resulting
fear, insecurity, and intimidation becomes part of everyday life and adds
to the burden of racialized discrimination. Again, not only are minority
group members defined by their race but these definitions have conse-
quences for their safety and well-being and influence the responses of
both offenders and the police, who are sworn to protect.
The remaining chapters illustrate the importance of understanding the
contextual meaning of race. Holdaway looks closely at the rank-and-file
occupational culture of the police. He reports that race is “intertwined
with other features” (p. 76) of the social world of the rank and file. What
may be considered routine police stops by other groups may be viewed
differently by black and Asian people. Holdaway suggests that in these
instances the police are influenced by factors like area of residence and
housing type, which “seem to mediate the impact of racial factors” (p.
88).
Holdaway concludes the book by discussing the measures taken by
police organizations to improve the quality of service provided to minor-
ity groups. He acknowledges a number of different approaches. He also
notes that minority police officers have entered the profession and have
been confronted with these same problems. Their efforts to organize and
deal with these issues are encouraged.
More important, Holdaway emphasizes the need to recognize how so-
cial criteria are used to racialize relations. To improve the delivery of
services to minorities, these notions, the social processes that led to these
ideas about crime and its relationship to minorities, and the organiza-
tional and cultural factors that lead to racialized outcomes must be under-
stood (p. 104). This book is appropriate as supplemental reading in an
upper level course in issues related to policing or by those interested in
cross-cultural comparative policing.
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Policing under Fire: Ethnic Conflict and Police-Community Relations in
Northern Ireland. By Ronald Weitzer. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1996. Pp. xiv1350. $19.95 (paper).
Denis O’Hearn
Queens University, Belfast
This volume addresses two audiences: sociologists of policing and stu-
dents of Ireland. In the first pursuit, Weitzer provides a descriptive model
of “divided society policing”: systematic bias in favor of the dominant
social group, politicized policing that strongly identifies with the regime,
dominant-group monopoly of top police positions, dual policing for coun-
terinsurgency and “ordinary law enforcement,” special powers against the
subordinate population, absence of effective police accountability, and
polarized community-police relations. He proposes that community-
police relations in divided societies are shaped at the neighborhood level
by police effectiveness at fighting ordinary crime, the intensity of counter-
insurgency policing, the legitimacy of the state in the neighborhood, and
national-level controversies over policing that spill over into local politi-
cal discourse.
Finally, in his implicit dynamic model, divided societies with “divided
society policing” evolve into “modern” societies with “liberal” policing.
Policymakers in “modern” societies such as Britain are more genuine
about reform than those in “traditional” societies. Although Weitzer (mer-
cifully) avoids describing Irish divisions as “tribal,” this implies a battle
between progressive British reforms and traditional Irish backwardness.
Weitzer tests his models with a thorough case study of policing since
the northern Irish state was created in 1922. He distinguishes two periods:
overt sectarian Protestant rule before 1968 and “reform” thereafter. His
comprehensive use of varied data sources gives his analysis more credibil-
ity than some previous studies of policing in northeastern Ireland that
uncritically used social attitude surveys or interviews of policemen them-
selves. Weitzer is knowledgeable about his case. His desire to present a
balanced analysis leaves him unwilling to whitewash police harassment,
violence, bias against Catholics, and so forth. He also has interesting in-
sights into the contradictory nature of police relations with Protestants.
Despite this, Weitzer’s functionalism and trust in British liberalism
limit his analysis. At the outset (pp. 3–4), he contrasts functionalist theo-
ries, which assume that policing provides protection and order, with con-
flict theories, which view police as repressive state organs that protect
dominant groups from subordinate groups seeking change. While conflict
approaches may explain communally divided societies, he argues, func-
tionalist approaches suit “liberal democracies,” where policing represents
broad community interests. Thus, while the pre-1970s sectarian Protes-
tant statelet was biased against the subordinate Catholics, Weitzer im-
plies, post-1960s policing is reformist in intent because it is administered
through direct rule by modern “pluralist” Britain.
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This leaves Weitzer needing to explain why the Royal Ulster Constabu-
lary (RUC), despite its goodwilled reformist intentions, is still unaccept-
able to Catholics. One answer is that special wartime conditions require
counterinsurgency policing. Although the British and the RUC are sin-
cerely trying to reform policing, they cannot succeed as long as the RUC
are responsible for counterinsurgency instead of just “ordinary policing.”
This fails to consider whether Western policing is less benign than
functionalist models presume. Ethnic or class biases may affect policing
in Western as well as peripheral societies. Moreover, even if states such
as Britain were internally pluralist, they might condone or even encour-
age less progressive policing in their colonies, hinterlands, or ghettos.
Weitzer admits that the nature of policing cannot be divorced from
politics. Ethnically divided political regimes limit the degree to which
polarized community-police relations can improve. But this conflicts with
his central thesis, that liberalization of counterinsurgency policing could
make policing more acceptable to the subordinate communities.
Thus, by focusing on counterinsurgency reforms, he fails to address
adequately whether the police (and the state in general) must be trans-
formed rather than reformed. He does not even discuss proposals to re-
place the RUC with community-oriented police services, although he is
rightly dismissive of conventional “community policing.” Instead, he con-
centrates on making the RUC more acceptable by liberalizing its counter-
insurgency methods in favor of more “ordinary policing.”
To his credit, Weitzer accepts that policing is a political problem and
that, ultimately, police acceptability demands political solutions. But his
interim solution underestimates the degree to which “ordinary” policing
inevitably has counterinsurgency aspects in states like Northern Ireland.
One wonders whether this book would have been more agnostic of
RUC and British state intentions in Ireland had it been written after the
events of July 1996 when the British state apparently capitulated to a
threat of wholesale police insubordination if RUC officers were forced to
confront their violent Protestant neighbors and friends who wanted to
march through Catholic neighborhoods. The police subsequently at-
tacked peaceful Catholic protesters with relish and, under the direction
of their British chief constable, held whole Catholic neighborhoods under
house arrest for days at a time. Even mainstream Catholics and normally
prounionist southern Irish politicians reluctantly concluded that little had
changed in the basic sectarian nature of policing and the northern state
since the 1960s, despite nearly 30 years of putative reforms. A basic prem-
ise of Weitzer’s book, that the RUC can reform itself and achieve broader
community support short of a political solution, may have been overtaken
by events.
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Bad Business: Professional Crime in Modern Britain. By Dick Hobbs.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. ix1140.
Neil Websdale
Northern Arizona University
As a working class Brit now working in the United States, I thoroughly
enjoyed Bad Business: Professional Crime in Modern Britain by Dick
Hobbs. Hobbs’s well-written book takes readers on a rich ethnographic
tour of the lives of professional criminals. He engages professional crimi-
nals on their own terms and in their own language in pubs, clubs, offices,
and their homes. Like other books in this genre, such as Wright and
Decker’s Burglars on the Job: Street Life and Residential Breakins
(Northeastern University Press, 1994), Hobbs presents professional crime
through the eyes of those who commit it, as they commit it.
Hobbs argues that it is impossible to distinguish neatly between profes-
sional crime and everyday business activities in the marketplace. Profes-
sional crime is subject to the same market forces as legitimate business.
Consequently we see “bad business” changing with structural alterations
in the marketplace, such as the deregulation of the London Stock Ex-
change in 1986 and the rise of increasingly sophisticated electronic com-
munications. Professional crime may be “bad business” but it is still none-
theless “business.” Hobbs’s central argument then is that “bad business”
is best appreciated against the historical ebb and flow of rational eco-
nomic forces. He does a fine job of contextualizing the historical drift
of professional criminals from cracking safes and robbing banks toward
myriad economic activities, some legitimate, some illegal, but all designed
to accumulate wealth.
The voices of professional criminals assume center stage in Hobbs’s
ethnography. The narrative is sprinkled with the linguistic skills of
working-class criminals. Banks are “tasty” (i.e., appealing to rob), inmates
“flob” (spit) on prison guards, some people are “wankers” (i.e., literally,
“masturbators” but colloquially “idiots”), commodities “fall off of lorries
[trucks]” (i.e., they are stolen, or perhaps more appropriately, redistrib-
uted), men talk of “birds” (women), and at times talk a load of “bollocks”
(i.e., literally, “testicles,” colloquially “bullshit”) and all are pursued by
“Old Bill” (police). Long interview excerpts weave a rich web of firsthand
experiences that alert readers to the motives, justifications, and linguistic
codes of “bad business” people.
We learn of the master craftsman, Dick Pooley, whose safecracking
exploits depend upon an intimate knowledge of explosives “in the way
that any craftsman would with the tools of his craft” (p. 15). Dick, and
his like, are now virtually extinct along with other “icons of proletarian
identity” (p. 18) such as the shipyards, coal mines, and steelworks. In his
account of a father and son team, Danny and Chris, we see the struggle
between generations of men and the way in which generational tensions
around the development of masculinity are mediated by the need to make
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money and to engage in professional crime. In the tale of Danny and
Chris, as in other tales, Hobbs echoes the work of Messerschmidt’s Mas-
culinities and Crime (Rowman and Littlefield, 1993) on the way in which
crime constitutes a vehicle for performing gender. We meet Fat Laurie,
whose bowel movement is carefully timed to coincide with the opening
of a public house called “The Dog.” At The Dog “pine disinfectant battles
with stale tobacco smoke and the phantoms of last night’s beer,” as Fat
Laurie takes a “shit and a Scotch” (p. 52). As “men of violence,” Gary
and Eric are much more than the dupes of Thatcher’s right-wing ideol-
ogy. Rather, Hobbs elucidates, they are young people with limited occu-
pational horizons but considerable initiative who drift from dishing out
violence to dealing amphetamines.
Through all these excerpts, and many more, we appreciate the agency
of professional criminals amid the shifting structural conditions of mod-
ern Britain. Changing technologies limit the ease with which banks can
be defrauded, safes are safer, the police have greater powers of surveil-
lance, and skilled meaningful labor is increasingly hard to come by. These
historical changes mean that a cohesive community of professional crimi-
nals that endures across generations is more myth than reality. Citing
Zygmunt Bauman (Intimations of Postmodernity [Routledge, 1992]),
Hobbs points out the professional criminal community is a “retrospective
unity” rather than a transhistorical reality. This “unity” is consistent with
the characters themselves who are what Hobbs calls “fantasists.”
Bad Business will be of immense interest to sociologists and criminolo-
gists. It is readable, theoretically eclectic, and richly insightful. If I have
a criticism it is that the author could have spent more time talking about
the intricacies of his approach. His approach is fairly straightforward,
but more methodological reflexivity might cast light on the homologies
between life as a professional criminal and social life in general.
Recriminalizing Delinquency: Violent Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Jus-
tice Reform. By Simon I. Singer. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1996. Pp. vii1230. $54.95.
Troy L. Armstrong
California State University, Sacramento
In 1978, the New York State Legislature voted, by overwhelming margin,
to pass the juvenile offender law, lowering the eligible age of criminal
responsibility to 13 years old for murder and 14 years old for other violent
offenses. Enactment of this statute shifted the initial locus of legal deci-
sion making about juvenile offenders who have been charged with spe-
cific violent felonies from juvenile justice officials to the criminal court
and culminated a lengthy period of debate over the wisdom of introduc-
ing legal procedures to allow waiver, the prosecution in criminal court
of designated juveniles under the legally recognized age of majority. At
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the same time, New York had long resisted efforts to establish legal pro-
cedures for waiver; it was one of the few states that had earlier set the
low general age of 16 years old for criminal responsibility. In this histori-
cal and legal context, a stringent legislative waiver statute was enacted.
The juvenile offender legislation was widely viewed by the public as
being motivated largely by political considerations that promoted a
strong stance against a perceived emerging epidemic of violent youth
crime. This law appeared to be promulgated as a direct result of several
heinous and highly publicized murders perpetrated in a callous, preda-
tory fashion by a 15-year-old chronic juvenile offender, who, due to his
age, could not be transferred to adult court. This relatively convenient
explanation leaves much to be desired, given what is currently known
about the complexity and range of factors identified as playing some role
in juvenile justice reform. Using this as an impetus for inquiry, Simon
I. Singer, who has previously written extensively on the topic of waiver,
constructs a far more expansive and challenging argument examining a
wide-ranging set of circumstances and a variety of multidimensional fac-
tors postulated as contributing in varying degrees to the creation, passage,
and impact of the 1978 juvenile offender law.
Written as a case study in juvenile justice reform, Recriminalizing De-
linquency provides a detailed and insightful account of a controversial
legislative enactment, its background, content, intent, and impact. Cer-
tainly, the publication of this volume is very timely. The perception held
by the public and elected officials about the escalating crisis in youth
violence has resulted in steps being taken in most states across the United
States to launch major initiatives to revise juvenile codes and to broaden
correctional statutes to shift policy and law concerning serious juvenile
offenders into a far tougher stance. At the heart of these changes have
been endeavors to enact new, harsher waiver statutes. This volume ad-
dresses one example of such an effort and has made a major contribution
to the emerging literature on waiver.
Singer structures his argument and account of the New York events
by organizing descriptive materials and analyses into a sequence of three
sections focusing upon the origins, implementation, and effects of the ju-
venile offender law. Discussion of origins explores antecedent activities
and evolving perceptions/attitudes that contributed to recriminalizing ju-
venile offenders, while examination of implementation focuses largely
upon the relative importance of those identified principles that appear
to have significance for assigning criminal responsibility. In addressing
impact, Singer attempts to determine whether any general deterrent effect
has been achieved by the juvenile offender law. Both the implementation
and impact sections benefit from the inclusion of very thorough multivar-
iate analyses, which provide valuable insight into the respective influence
of a substantial array of potentially relevant variables. In addition, a final
substantive chapter describes the attitudes and perceptions about the in-
carceration of youth who had been sentenced as adults and committed
to a secure facility under the law.
1759
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.18 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 23:23:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology
To demonstrate that understanding of the dynamics of juvenile justice
reform must be grounded in a complexly configured framework, Singer
proposes a strategy for explanation that incorporates consideration of a
wide set of organizational constructs and principles. At the heart of his
argument is a series of assertions and assumptions—derived largely from
organizational theory—about the inherent structural and processual na-
ture of this particular bureaucratic arena. From Singer’s perspective, key
to a proper assessment and analysis of planned change in juvenile justice
is the fact of its being a loosely coupled system in which there is both a
tendency for confusion in decision making across subsystem boundaries
and little coordination among component parts. Within this framework,
he repeatedly asserts that recriminalization (e.g., introduction of legisla-
tive waiver) is one optional direction in which a juvenile justice system
can be moved as it creates another legal subsystem for responding to
deviant behavior. Singer argues that the kind of toughened measures that
he examines in the book do little to demolish the existing juvenile justice
system but rather serve to preserve a rationale and need for its continued
existence.
My only two reservations with Singer’s analyses and conclusions focus
upon the deliberate uncertainty that he has introduced into his central
argument and the level of interactive complexity he has deemed necessary
in his discussion of contributing factors. With regard to the former, by
admitting that he does not possess any direct measure of tightly and
loosely coupled systems of justice, Singer generates a sense of uncertainty
in his analysis that results in an inconclusiveness in his findings. With
regard to the latter, the set of organizational concerns and interests identi-
fied as being potentially relevant to the sudden emergence of waiver legis-
lation in New York State, as well as the interactive complexity of these
factors, left this reader slightly bewildered. Yet, through this ambitious
design, Singer has clearly set an agenda for subsequent research that
should provide an opportunity for new and important insights to be ob-
tained about the juvenile justice reform process.
Contested Meanings: The Construction of Alcohol Problems. By Joseph
R. Gusfield. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996. Pp. ix1374.
$56.50 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).
Joel Best
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Like athletes, sociologists can become known for characteristic moves,
favorite analytic turns. Joseph Gusfield, for instance, likes to dissect
taken-for-granted assumptions, taking what everyone seems to accept
without question, and exposing it as a construction of unexamined asser-
tions, favored for its convenience to established interests. This analytic
turn can be found throughout Contested Meanings; the very title warns
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us that knowledge is debatable. This volume collects 13 Gusfield essays
about alcohol problems; although eight of the papers, dating from 1967
to 1991, are reprinted, most first appeared in specialized collections and
will be new to many readers. Throughout, Gusfield seems to delight in
challenging the obvious, in questioning what everyone knows about alco-
hol problems and policies.
Gusfield argues that, since the 1930s, alcohol problems have been de-
fined by—owned by—“the alcoholism movement,” the coalition of aca-
demics, treatment professionals, government agencies, and Alcoholics
Anonymous that has promoted the notion of alcoholism. The movement
views alcohol problems, such as drunken driving, public drunkenness,
and fetal alcohol syndrome, as located in particular individuals (alcohol-
ics or at least “problem drinkers”), therefore it promotes policies designed
to identify these individuals and help them “recover” by not drinking.
Thus, those arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) are ordered
to attend classes on drinking designed to help them recognize that they
“have a problem.” Because such policies often have little effect, a “new
temperance movement” has emerged, dedicated to limiting access to alco-
hol, reducing alcohol consumption, and convincing categories of individ-
uals (e.g., pregnant women) to reduce or stop drinking. While these claims
are so commonplace as to seem unexceptional, Gusfield dismantles them
and makes the familiar strange.
He reminds us that drinking is both a widespread practice and some-
thing of a learned skill. Most adults drink, and most drinking does not
cause much harm. While it may be true that the people who drink the
most are more likely to get in trouble, many people drink heavily without
incident, and at least some problems occur because drinkers are inexperi-
enced. There are plenty of individuals who drink regularly but view
themselves as competent drinkers who can “handle it”; they may, for ex-
ample, drink and drive, yet argue that they take extra care, know their
limits, and so on. Such individuals are likely to resist the alcoholism
movement’s claims that they are problem drinkers, even when they expe-
rience arrest or some other difficulty. Gusfield explores this world of ordi-
nary drinking in three chapters reporting on ethnographic fieldwork; two
of these describe drinking in bars and the drinkers’ subsequent decisions
to drive, while the third examines probation hearings and classes for driv-
ers with DUI arrests. He finds drinkers who believe they can take care
of themselves, bartenders who keep a protective eye on regular custom-
ers, and offenders who resist claims that their DUI arrests reveal any-
thing more than their bad luck in being stopped when they had high
blood-alcohol counts. Where the alcoholism movement sees problem
drinkers in denial, Gusfield is willing to ask how drinkers construct their
own activities.
In his analysis, drinking becomes a situated activity: people drink, not
because they are driven by internal compulsions, but because they enjoy
it, because they value the sense of playful release. People drive after they
drink for various reasons—notably because driving is often the most
1761
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.18 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 23:23:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology
practicable way to get to and from bars—and they drink in bars because
the law often limits the public places where drinking can occur. Does it
make sense, Gusfield asks, to define drinking problems solely in terms of
people’s freedom to choose to drink, while ignoring the limits on their
choices for transportation or locations for drinking? Why do we treat
drinking and driving as a drinking problem rather than a driving
problem?
The ownership of alcohol problems is in the hands of experts and agen-
cies who delimit our sense of what is problematic and thereby promote
particular sorts of solutions. If alcohol problems are moral problems,
caused by problem drinkers’ irresponsibility, then experts must either
convince problem drinkers not to drink or, by limiting access to alcohol,
make drinking more difficult. Because such policies ignore the wide-
spread acceptance of drinking, they find little support among ordinary
drinkers. Gusfield notes the long history—and limited effectiveness—of
alcohol education programs, suggesting that their enduring “is one of the
clearest arguments for the persistance of magic in modern societies” (p.
285). He continually challenges the effectiveness of broad policies based
on narrow definitions, arguing instead for considering of piecemeal ap-
proaches that identify and address key elements in the situations where
alcohol use seems most likely to lead to trouble.
While those interested in alcohol problems will, of course, find this
book provocative, the questions Gusfield raises are relevant to other so-
cial problems, too. Alcohol is not the only product associated with leisure
and defined as problematic, for which reduced access is promoted as a
solution. There are parallel claims, calls to restrict or ban guns, tobacco,
rap music, pornography, illicit drugs, war toys, and so on. It can be ar-
gued that, like alcohol, these products sometimes lead to serious trouble,
but the great majority of the time they do not, and, also like alcohol,
they inspire vigorous debates between their critics and their consumer-
defenders. Contested Meanings suggests that, in studying these debates,
sociologists should be slow to buy into unexamined assumptions, that the
construction of meaning should be studied, not just taken for granted.
Alcoholics Anonymous as a Mutual-Help Movement: A Study in Eight
Societies. By Klaus Makela et al. Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1996. Pp. xii1310. $46.00 (cloth); $14.95 (paper).
Paul M. Roman
University of Georgia
The 1935 beginnings of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) involved an unex-
pected meeting and bonding between two upper-middle-class male
WASPs in Akron, Ohio, a prototypical heartland American city. Their
perceptions of releasing each other from the grips of alcohol addiction
through mutual confession of shared weaknesses and shared humanity
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strongly motivated their search for other alcoholics, mostly like them-
selves. Their efforts spiraled into an amazing organizational structure,
centered around a therapy combining folk, medical, and spiritual ele-
ments.
Arising from mainstream American culture, AA has achieved symbolic
dominance over America’s popular imagery of routes into and out of alco-
holism. How far has AA diffused beyond the narrow boundaries of its
beginnings? An important response is this collaboration, framed around
excitement about AA’s international diffusion, and providing multifac-
eted descriptions of the fellowship in the United States, Finland, Sweden,
Iceland, Poland, Austria, Switzerland, and Mexico. The study attempts
an organizational analysis, demarcated from extensive sociological schol-
arship on individual AA experiences.
The 18 authors apparently concurred on a descriptive framework for
presenting their findings that unfortunately discourages analytic insights.
Many observations are fragmented and shallow, even trivial for those
uninterested in the specifics of AA structure and process. Sidestepped are
opportunities for sociological analyses of the interplay among AA process
and structure and the host sociocultural environments. For example, a
start at an in-depth description shows that AA in Poland is intertwined
with the Roman Catholic Church, an incredible contrast with AA’s tradi-
tionally strident independence from extraorganizational connections. But
I was disappointed when the description trailed off with the pallid com-
ment that the church is a dominant presence in Poland.
Without macroanalyses of structural and cultural supports, the ques-
tion of the true extent of AA’s diffusion remains. AA’s early leaders were
sensitive to the contextual limits of its WASP-ish beginnings, and through
the 1960s its General Service Board worried about successful outreach
of the fellowship to minorities and women. Today, AA’s success beyond
white middle-class males seems widely accepted, and the albeit modest
documentation of this achievement is cited in this volume. For some, in-
ternational diffusion data complete the paradigm that AA can work any-
where. Yet it must be recognized that the “ways of knowing” about AA’s
successful diffusion are extraordinarily limited: its guarantees of anonym-
ity and ephemeral definitions of membership preclude valid organiza-
tional demography.
Despite extensive AA diffusion, these authors observe that many if not
most persons who first attend an AA meeting do not return. These invisi-
ble masses for whom AA does not “click” presumably share a belief that
they have a significant drinking problem. Yet we know little about them,
their lack of attraction to AA, and the ultimate resolution of their trou-
bles. Cross-cultural observations of this attrition might temper this
book’s opening assertion that “AA is one of the great success stories of
our century” (p. 3).
A different methodological problem is determining the significance of
AA in a nation’s collective definitions surrounding alcohol problems. This
study affirms that AA is “there” in these eight nations. But the signifi-
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cance of its presence is contingent upon its place among other cultural
definitions and strategies used to cope with alcohol problems. These is-
sues are avoided almost completely.
To wit, a striking set of data demonstrates dramatic growth of AA
activity in Latin America. Despite the national expertise across the writ-
ing team, little effort is made to explain this development or why growth
is slower elsewhere. Some unique Mexican AA practices are described,
but there is no linkage offered between the Latin American sociocultural
environment and the upward trajectory of AA activity. Moreover, given
the emergence of widespread disruptive drinking in nations in early
stages of economic development, insights from AA’s growth in Latin
America could address future human misery elsewhere in the world.
Further needs for comparative analysis are highlighted by central AA
beliefs that abstinence is essential for recovery, and that striving for absti-
nence is a condition of continued participation in AA. By contrast, espe-
cially in Western Europe, an alternative perspective holds that regaining
control over drinking may be a reasonable solution for uncontrolled
drinking. Abstinent “recovering alcoholics” in U.S. culture comprise a so-
cial category, have substantial opportunities for interaction with each
other, and enjoy a modicum of social dignity. Such constructions of mean-
ings and of opportunities for social integration may not transcend cultural
boundaries; the meaning of AA membership in a non-U.S. culture is encap-
sulated within that culture’s complex of definitions. The potentially huge
implications of such differences are not systematically addressed here.
This book offers a plethora of detail about AA in these eight nations,
but meager fare for those seeking sociological knowledge about compara-
tive organizational systems. Future research needs are well articulated,
and, in its defense, the volume may be characterized as an invitation for
further inquiry. Its impact may be enhanced by a forthcoming companion
collection of national case studies of AA.
Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial. By Eva Bertram, Morris Blach-
man, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1996. Pp. xiv1347. $48.00 (cloth); $17.95
(paper).
James A. Inciardi
University of Delaware
Americans have experienced a number of alternative approaches to drug
control for generations. One legacy has been limited success while an-
other has been an occasional spate of books on the topic. In fact, criticiz-
ing American drug policy seems to have become a cause ce´le`bre for both
academics and policy analysts—particularly those who have done little
work in the drug field. Drug War Politics represents the latest entry to
the literature in this regard.
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The authors state that the book is not just another book about the
failure of U.S. drug policy but rather the politics of the drug war—the
politics of denial—and the struggle for drug policy reform. The “politics
of denial” refers to the reasons why the drug war’s fatal flaws and collat-
eral damage are for the most part ignored.
Part 1 of the book was written to expose the pattern of denial and
examines some of the reasons why many Americans fail to see the ways
in which the drug war serves to create and exacerbate the problems of
drug abuse, addiction, and crime. Part 2 looks at the politics of denial
and asks questions about the nature of these politics and why they persist.
Part 3 discusses alternatives to the current drug war, such as legalizing
drugs (which they agree is also a flawed approach) and implementing a
public health paradigm.
On the positive side, the book is extremely well written and contains
material that will certainly be of interest to many readers who have had
limited exposure to the great drug debate. Of special interest in this re-
gard is the history of the drug wars, from the early struggles during the
first three decades of this century through the entrenchment of the “puni-
tive paradigm” in midcentury, followed by the “presidential drug wars”
and the emergence of the “narco-enforcement complex.”
Unfortunately, however, for those of us who have been following the
drug wars over the years, there is nothing new in this book. There are
at least a dozen or so other monographs and perhaps a hundred or more
scholarly papers that have been published in the last three years that
have said essentially the same things. All too often we have heard that
the supply-reduction strategy of drug control (which includes interdic-
tion, enforcement, asset forfeiture, and foreign assistance initiatives de-
signed to keep drugs out of the United States and drug dealers off the
streets) just does not work—which it does not. At the same time, we
have been hearing that the demand reduction strategy (which includes
prevention, education, and treatment) has been short-changed over the
years in the federal drug war budgets—which it has.
When scholars from one or more fields step out of their areas of exper-
tise into others, there is always the risk of making both minor and major
errors. The authors of Drug War Politics are not from the drug field: one
is a policy analyst and organizational consultant, two are professors of
government and political science, the last is a specialist in foreign policy
studies, and all have fallen into this trap. One of the more obvious is
their belief in what I have often referred to as the “enslavement theory
of addiction.” Enslavement theory holds that because of drug prohibition
and because of the high price of heroin, cocaine, and other illegal sub-
stances on the drug black market, otherwise law-abiding citizens are
forced into criminal careers in order to support their expensive drug hab-
its. The theory sounds quite logical, and it has been repeated many times
over the years. The problem with enslavement theory is that in most cases
it is just not so. For the great majority of drug-involved offenders, drug
use did not precede their careers in crime. Although drug use tends to
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intensify their law-breaking behaviors, their criminal patterns were well
established before their drug initiation. There are dozens of empirical
studies documenting this phenomenon, and the authors neglected to men-
tion them.
As a final point, the authors argue quite forcefully that the use of illegal
drugs should be treated not as a crime but as a public health problem.
This certainly makes sense because, after all, the wars on drugs have for
the most part failed. However, this is certainly not a new idea. Although
the “public-health paradigm” in one form or another has been called dif-
ferent things by different people—the medical approach, the disease
model, demand reduction, and the harm reduction paradigm—it has
been suggested for generations and parts of it actually have been imple-
mented as part of the “war on drugs.” In short, although this is a well-
written book, it was disappointing because of its failure to offer any new
insight on America’s great drug war.
Fringe and Fortune: The Role of Critics in High and Popular Art. By
Wesley Monroe Shrum, Jr. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1996. Pp. xvi1284. $49.50 (cloth); $17.95 (paper).
Judith R. Blau
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
It was Henry James’s view that criticism was an aesthetic discourse, in
contrast to reviewing, which he considered to be practical and journalis-
tic (Literary Reviews and Essays on American, English, and French Lit-
erature, [Twayne, 1957]). Yet James would have missed the subtle clarity
with which Shrum makes the distinction between critics and reviewers.
Shrum’s theoretical point is that critical standards that help to distance
audiences from their experiences and direct pleasure are central to a so-
ciological understanding of high art and not relevant for the enjoyment
of popular culture. Very specifically, high culture is to criticism as popular
culture is to reviewing. Audiences of high culture are engaged, through
critical mediation, in the evaluation of art products, whereas popular cul-
ture is enjoyed directly, without intervention or an interpretive mediator.
Fringe and Fortune arrived on my desk the week after returning from
the Avignon Theater Off Festival, which was the perfect time to read a
book on the Edinburgh Fringe Festival. The genre can be described in
the terms of a public festival—dense crowds, street theater, and perfor-
mances in semiofficial as well as in official venues. There is a zany mix-
ture of carnival and authenticity, sublimity and silliness, satires on sub-
limity and satires on silliness, political happenings, and multimedia
events. The genre, as I concluded, and Shrum confirms, can be superfi-
cially described as a crossover between P. T. Barnum, Studs Terkel, and
funky Aristophanes.
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Therefore, my own casual observations in Avignon, supported by
much of Shrum’s lively ethnographic description, led me to expect an
analysis of a theater festival in terms of a conception of the public sphere
or of public culture. Shrum confirms that such a conception is useful but
also articulates a theoretical perspective to clarify how aesthetic values
apply to some but not all of the theatrical endeavors at the Fringe Festi-
val. His conclusions are based on a clear and insightful overview of the
theory and the history of aesthetics as well as his sociological investiga-
tion, consisting of interviews—with cab drivers, theatergoers, pub cus-
tomers, street people, producers, ticket vendors, and actors—as well as an
appropriately scaled quantitative analysis of audience composition and of
reviews.
The Fringe Festival is an especially ambitious undertaking; in 1988,
the year in which Schrum did his research, there were 913 advertised
programs, with about 100 to 500 performances a day, and it extended
over a two-week period. He distinguishes between events that are defined
by high-art standards (theater, opera, mime, dance, orchestra, recitals,
poetry) and those that are broadly popular and entertaining (defined by
the categories of comedy, musical, revue, cabaret, folk, jazz, rock, and
events for children). He is careful to point out that his job as critic for
a magazine, the List, gave him access to places and people that he would
not otherwise have had. Being a critic also provided him with a way of
being a spectator of his own professional reactions and those of other
journalist critics.
Thus, the thesis and the corroborating evidence indicate that it is criti-
cal discourse that maintains the line between high and low. Critics define
and maintain legitimacy and standards within the realm of high art, but
in the realm of popular art, personal tastes prevail. The book includes
an excellent and stunning review of relevant theories in aesthetics and
the sociology of art and of culture.
Against his own thesis, he poses two alternative ones: “convergency
theory” (Herbert Gans and my own work), which posits a diminishing
difference between audiences and between products with regard to high
and popular art, and “cultural capital theory” (Pierre Bourdieu and Paul
DiMaggio), which posits that status interests help to maintain the differ-
entiation of high and popular. Shrum provides some support for the “om-
nivore thesis” (Richard A. Peterson), namely that educated people have
wide-ranging interests and indulge in many kinds of art activities. How-
ever, Shrum’s arguments are based as much on audiences’ tastes as on
the importance of the tastemakers. Shrum’s analysis poses further unan-
swered queries as well: In their mediation role, what gives critics the
warrant to exercise judgment? To the extent that criticism is not
grounded in clear aesthetic conventions, who has the right to be a critic?
Why is an Olympic gymnastic performance not high art if it must be
explained by an expert to television audiences? Is a Mozart piece popular
or high art when it is rearranged for a film? Is not jazz the test case that
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a genre can cross the “great divide”? Quality—what is intrinsic only to
high culture—is constructed through discourse as critics repeatedly eval-
uate works, and it is our repeated readings of critics that inform our judg-
ments. Fringe and Fortune has a charm and wit that novelist James
would have liked.
A Space on the Side of the Road: Cultural Poetics in an “Other” America.
By Kathleen Stewart. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Pp. xii1243. $49.50 (cloth); $15.95 (paper).
Karen McCarthy Brown
Drew University
Kathleen Stewart has written a subtle and rich ethnography of south-
western West Virginia. From everyday language—what the locals call
“just talk”—Stewart conjures a dynamic, conflictual portrait of life in the
“hollers” and coal camps. Here is a rendering that evokes liquid cultural
patterns never allowed to solidify.
A Space on the Side of the Road reproduces and analyzes the words
of individuals occupying a gap in space/time left when progress deserted
the coal camps of West Virginia. The author suggests that telling the
story of America and progress from the perspective of the Other “tweak[s]
the anxieties and desires that motivate the master narratives of center
and margin, self and other” (p. 6). In the United States, so-called Appala-
chia has surely become one such Other, an object of “both dread and
desire” (p. 118). Appalachia has come to embody both old-fashioned au-
thenticity and “a degraded state of nature” (p. 119). But this is not a book
about stereotypes. It is something much more interesting—a book about
the folk of Egeria, Odd, and ’Miga and the ways they configure their
world. Stewart’s compassionate intelligence shines through her text, as
does her considerable knowledge of and ease within the hollers and coal
towns where she lived and moved during two years of field research
(1980–82).
The author invites her reader to “imagine the kind of place where,
when something happens, people make sense of it not by constructing an
explanation of what happened but by offering accounts of its impacts,
traces, and signs” (p. 57). Thus a litany of violence and loss may be pro-
voked by a simple request for directions.
All right, now, go on down Miss Banks’s place past that big ol’ bridge where
that McKinney boy went over and it looks like you might go in after’m.
. . . Keep on ’til you see the Black Eagle post office. That’s where the snake
handlers stay at and Bud said he’s skeered to deliver the mail down there
where he might put his hand in a mailbox and there’s a snake in there . . . .
All Right, now, keep on, keep on, pretty soon you come to the place where
they shot up that boy. What was that boy’s name? You know that one kilt
his wife. (pp. 56–57)
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Stewart tracks the narrative alchemy whereby tales from a world “got
down” (when told just right) produce new hope and new energy to endure
daily trials. She notes the “nervous” scanning of the environment—nature,
the neighbors, even heaven itself—to look for signs of trouble around the
corner. And she names the double bind of a sociality that thrives on an
excess of information about others, while at the same time placing a high
value on privacy and condemning those who stick their noses into anoth-
er’s business.
A Space on the Side of the Road is also a theoretical book of consider-
able merit. Stewart situates her work in the center of the “new ethnogra-
phy,” a diverse collection of recent, experimental, ethnographies respon-
sive to a variety of postmodernist influences. The ethnographer, she
believes, cannot resolve the subject/object dilemma through current con-
fessional practices, such as situating oneself in the narrative. Neither can
the researcher gather up voices and put them in her text, pretending that
they are speaking for themselves. “There is no textual solution,” Stewart
says with refreshing candor. The only thing to do, she suggests, is write
ethnographic narratives that track the nervous signals of culture in every-
day sociality.
Facing a question that pops up frequently these days among anthropol-
ogists, “What is a culture anyway?” Stewart gives no more comfort than
she gave to ethnographers. But unlike some critics, Stewart does not sug-
gest that we drop the word culture from our working vocabulary any-
more than she suggests that we stop writing ethnographies. We need not
give up on the concept of culture simply because it cannot be reduced
to fixed sets of values and beliefs. Culture simply is not “something that
can be gotten right,” not ever. According to Stewart, culture can only be
evoked through “multilayered narratives of the poetic in the everyday
life of things” (p. 210).
A Place on the Side of the Road is without a doubt one of the best
examples of the new ethnography, but it is not an unproblematic work.
Particularly in the first half of the book, the reader strains to accomodate
the jolt that comes with frequent shifts between the rhythmic, under-
stated, and wickedly innovative narratives of Stewart’s West Virginia
sources and her own densely packed analytic prose. It is one of the great
ironies of our time that postmodernism, and I intend the term to refer to
the broad intellectual movement with the best chance of bringing new
voices into the arena of academic discourse, has adopted a mode of dis-
course that too often masks its democratic impulse.
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Why the Wealthy Give: The Culture of Elite Philanthropy. By Francie
Ostrower. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1995. Pp. xi1250.
$29.95.
Paul G. Schervish
Boston College
My research shows that at least 40% of all personal charitable contribu-
tions are made by households in the top 3.5% of the income distribution.
For this reason alone, Ostrower’s examination of the meaning and prac-
tice of philanthropy among 88 elite New York City donors is informative
for students of philanthropy, culture, and American institutions. The
leading question of the book is given by the title—to excavate the culture
of elite philanthropy. It is difficult to pin down an analytical definition
of elite philanthropy. Ostrower’s functional one is that elite philanthropy
is the array of social relationships of power and prestige by which the
wealthy “take philanthropy . . . and adapt it into an entire way of life
that serves as a vehicle for the cultural and social life of their class” (p.
6). Philanthropy, in short, is one of the most comprehensive indicators
and effective producers of the cultural status, social cohesion, and per-
sonal identity of the wealthy.
While emphasizing that the wealthy never abandon their class trait to
do what they want, where they want, and in the way they want, Ostrower
correctly identifies wide variation in specific personal motivations and
activities the elite manifest in accomplishing their underlying purposes
of power and privilege. She provides important insights about the cen-
trality of the associational ties that elite cultural, medical, and educational
institutions use to attract and reward contributors. As in all studies of
the elite, we hear much about board memberships, social networks, and
the strategies of boundary maintenance aimed at determining who is to
be welcomed into the stratosphere of elite philanthropy. We learn that
wealth holders of all political stripes concur that they should be able dis-
pose of their wealth however they wish, that they know better than Uncle
Sam about how to spend their legacies, and that philanthropic bequests
are an honorable alternative to estate taxation. The wealthy agree that
philanthropy should never take on the massive social welfare or basic
research agendas that are properly the responsibility of government. We
learn too that the elite are more likely to follow class rather than religious
or ethnic patterns in giving, that they seldom get directly involved with
the ultimate beneficiaries of their largesse, and that women are less likely
than their male counterparts to hold positions of authority.
The wealthy are thoroughly committed to a positive view of philan-
thropy and cannot be shaken from it. Employing a wonderfully astute
interview technique, Ostrower proposed to her respondents a series of
negative criticisms of elite philanthropy, namely that philanthropy in-
duces dependency among the needy, encourages fraud, abets social snob-
bery, and legitimizes an undemocratic exercise of power. The wealthy
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dismissed most of these putative criticisms outright; the rest they reject
after only brief consideration. The wealthy readily acknowledge their
command over a disproportionate amount of resources. But this only for-
tifies their social mission: they are obligated to make a public difference,
and they are doing so through their philanthropy.
The major shortcoming of the book is that it draws general conclusions
about the wealthy population from an unrepresentative and unweighted
sample of New York City donors. To her credit, Ostrower warns the
reader about her narrow sample, but for some reason she fails to write
the bulk of the text with that caution in mind. For example, the first
sentence of the conclusion states that “this book has asked why wealthy
donors engage in philanthropy” (p. 132). Because her sample does not
reflect the wealthy of New York, much less of the nation, her study can-
not answer this question. In another example, the book purports to chart
the relative distribution of motives, roles, relationships, and functions of
philanthropy by the wealthy. However, the sample allows Ostrower only
to map the existence of such attributes for some elite New York donors
to only 48 of the city’s nonprofit organizations. It does not allow her to
generalize—as her tables, multivariate analyses, and conclusions appear
to do—about the philanthropy of the American wealthy. Perhaps a more
accurate title for the book (one closer to earlier titles she used) would be
Why Some of the New York Wealthy Give. To put the wealthy of New
York City in perspective, there are nearly 70,000 households with at least
$1 million in adjusted gross income, and 4.5 million households with a
net worth of at least $1 million. My interviews with millionaires indicate
that elite philanthropy is only part of the panorama of wealth and philan-
thropy engaged in by millions of people. The foundations the wealthy
create, the novel programs and community projects they initiate, and the
nonelite institutions and organizations they support are all evidence of
something more than elite philanthropy. I do not think Ostrower means
to say that all philanthropy by the wealthy is elite philanthropy, but this
is one meaning of what she says. As a study of why the wealthy give in
the United States, the book is flawed. As a study of philanthropy sur-
rounding the elite institutions in New York City, this book has significant
merit.
Intellectuals and Public Life: Between Radicalism and Reform. Edited
by Leon Fink, Stephen T. Leonard, and Donald M. Reid. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xii1327. $47.50 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).
Michael D. Kennedy
University of Michigan
Originating in a seminar at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, these 12 essays take the sociology of public intellectuals well beyond
available collections for their geographical range and historical-theoretical
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engagement. The split between intellectual as expert and intellectual as
critic serves as a volume leitmotif.
Leonard begins with a genealogy of the politicized intellectual, embed-
ding it in the old sociology of intellectuals and newer postmodern and
Gramscian approaches. Lloyd Kramer follows with an account of En-
lightenment intellectuals in Habermasian and Foucauldian modes, using
the expert/critic divide as a foil and prop to inspire our recuperation of
their recombination.
Intellectual histories are the obvious method to analyze public intellec-
tuals. The engaging social theory and fascinating biography of Regis
Debray and W. E. B. DuBois are inspiring because, in words and deed,
they have been powerful critics of establishment and movements. Reid
and Tom Holt magnify their original brilliance with insightful elabora-
tion. Liberation theology’s centering of the poor also inspires, but whom?
Roberto Goizueta’s concise account of theological innovations does not
assess social consequence, and Protestant Evangelism’s explosion makes
a better claim to being the consequential theological innovation in Latin
American Christian base communities. A more social history can help
assess intellectuality’s embeddedness and ideology’s consequence.
With good timing, intellectual debate can play a vital role in trans-
forming the state. Mary Furner describes how the debate between statist
and associative economists “economized” U.S. turn-of-the-century dis-
course and facilitated the move away from laissez faire’s static individu-
alism. Fink’s exploration of the 1912–15 Commission on Industrial Rela-
tions begins with the opportune moment but turns to a careful dissection
of how personal conflict and contending visions of intellectuals—as agita-
tors of public opinion and as engineers of policy—destroyed opportunity.
Ellen DuBois’s story of U.S. activist women writing history and making
archives, 1880–1940, suggests that we consider “effect” as both immediate
and longer term. Movement theorists have long thought in these terms
as well as about how opportunities for intellectual consequence are made.
Craig Calhoun shows how in 1989 protesting students drew on long
traditions of Chinese intellectual praxis and on a global vision of liberal-
ism circulating through indigenous public spheres and international me-
dia to define the nation’s cultural crisis. But Chinese students went be-
yond their advisors to push for what could not be expected. The student
demand for dialogue with the authorities was a more radical challenge
to hierarchy than most Western observers appreciate in their imagina-
tions of democracy for others. Studying intellectuals directly invites cul-
ture and politics to meet in the social and encourages us to explore the
variety of critique and the authority for its expression.
Geoff Eley shifts the familiar critique of critical intellectuals—the re-
current gap between rank and file conservatism and the doctrine of ideo-
logues—away from state policy and the pronouncements of elites toward
the implication of German socialist ideology in the everyday life of its
working class. He shows how the socialists’ prewar cultural conservatism
and Kaiserreich’s authoritarian political culture limited counterhegem-
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ony and intellectuality’s spread. But he also demonstrates how the social-
ists created the subculture in which cultural radicalism of a wider organic
intelligentsia was produced. Exploding and splitting under Weimar, the
group of organic intellectuals faced other challenges too: their condescen-
sion for everyday worker culture and new media and fascist movements
that captured popular desire better than they.
James Epstein’s story of Richard Carlile and the English zetetic clubs
of the first half of the 19th century reinforces the analytical appeal of
such an expanded theory of intellectuality. Carlile’s followers were uncre-
dentialed autodidacts but with a commitment to reason that marginalized
them from the masses. Another story of distance from the masses with
more familiar invocations of intellectual distinction is Jane Burbank’s
magisterial account of the Russian intelligentsia from Peter the Great
through Gorbachev. Her review of debates on the group’s historic role
shows that while they were not Gramscian “organic” intellectuals, they
always managed to claim authority to speak on the nation’s behalf.
When the nation, rather than public policy or popular mobilization, is
the object of intellectuals’ desire, the expert/critical tension looms less
large. The nation’s lability limits obligations of reason and empiricism.
While the popular might resist the intellectual’s refashioning and the
state demand the presentation of expertise, the nation can be held to be
more than what exists and accessible only to peculiar vision. Even with-
out the ear of the state, the support of the movement, or the advantage
of the moment, intellectuals often claim authority to define the nation, if
not always with immediate consequence. What privileges this articula-
tion, and when is it consequential? The answer begins here. This collec-
tion offers the comparative historical sociology of public intellectuals a
wonderful foundation for teaching and puts the public consequence of
intellectuality to the center of our work.
The Enchantment of Sociology: A Study of Theology and Culture. By
Kieran Flanagan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Pp. xiv1226.
Richard K. Fenn
Princeton Theological Seminary
Flanagan is a senior lecturer in the sociology of religion at the University
of Bristol. In this book, he surveys not only the complex relationships
between sociology and theology, but he roots them in what he perceives to
be the dominant trends of a postmodern social system. A Roman Catholic
himself, he is at war with theologians who have become too eager for
relevance and with sociologists who fail to discern the truly sacred from
its many false appearances. The Enchantment of Sociology is part analy-
sis, part diatribe on the order of Julian Benda’s Durkheimian attack on
utilitarians in The Treason of the Intellectuals (Norton, [1928] 1969). Not
only sociologists but the clergy and theologians have lost their capacity
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to discern the sacred and to pass judgment on false gods. Caught up in
a world that they mistakenly believe to be secular, they miss its various
forms of sacralization. Secularization, in Flanagan’s view, is a myth; at
best it characterized “modernity” when “the rules of engagement” be-
tween the religious and the secular were clearer and more widely under-
stood.
If sociologists were to be more to Flanagan’s liking, they would de-
velop a number of critical faculties and capacities for judgment. They
would need, first of all, the capacity to distinguish the sacred from the
mundane or secular: a difficult task in a world that blurs the boundaries
between them. In his sixth chapter, Flanagan argues that sociologists
must recognize that they are living in a postsecular world, where “reli-
gious objects are resited on a field of religious indifference” (p. 190).
Drawing heavily on an earlier discussion of Pierre Bourdieu, Flanagan
stipulates that the cultural “field” is a difficult one in which to wage battle
for the sacred. There are too many players who can produce and consume
the sacred, naming it to their own satisfaction. It is also difficult to know
what are the rules for fighting over what is and is not sacred.
According to Flanagan, sociologists ought to be better at this game
than they are, but sociologists are caught up in their own subfields, where
they talk about postmodernism without the benefit of any “transcending
affinities.” Because they are tone-deaf to religion and theologically illiter-
ate, they are in no position to separate the truly sacred from the sham.
In a world of overlapping “fields,” sociologists have no sense of their own
boundaries and are in a “liminal” relationship to theology. Thus they lack
the firm ground and clear boundaries that might otherwise enable them
to pass judgment on those who turn religious symbols into commodities.
A more serious indictment is Flanagan’s accusation that sociologists are
oblivious to their own petty heresies and thus unable to recognize their
own Pelagian or Neoplatonic tendencies. A “reflexive” sociology, he
would argue, should be more adept at theological self-criticism.
The tone and some of the content of Flanagan’s book echo Durkheim’s
diatribe against the utilitarians. There is a similar impatience with those
who study the practical and the mundane without discerning the univer-
sal; those who see only the parts but fail to recognize the whole miss the
very groundwork of social life and mistake form for substance. Flana-
gan’s sense of despair frequently reminded me of Fritz Stern’s (The Poli-
tics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of German Ideology [Univer-
sity of California Press, 1961]) “politics of cultural despair”: the ethos that
provided a cultural demand for fascism. Flanagan sees a danger in any
demands for purity and totality, but he locates this danger in the residues
of the Enlightenment rather than in his own Durkheimian tendencies.
It is crucial, Flanagan argues, for sociologists to speak of “the cultiva-
tion of virtue, and the subcultures that embody and realise its basis” (p.
120). A Christian sociology may be in order, but in that venture, sociolo-
gists will get little help from theologians, who have sold their birthright
for a mess of liberal or utilitarian pottage. If Flanagan is right, there also
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should have been more protest and judgment from sociologists who have
studied the process of secularization. He is particularly scathing with re-
gard to the work of Bryan Wilson. Wilson (Religion in Sociological Per-
spective [Oxford University Press, 1982]) has (rightly) discerned the de-
cline of the sacred in social life but is too dispassionate about it.
According to Flanagan, Wilson’s response has been “neutered”; Flanagan
even accuses Wilson of using sociology as a “professional mask” for his
own “death wish to belief” (p. 115).
His colleagues in the sociology of religion might not agree with Flana-
gan’s representation of their work. For instance, not only has Wilson ex-
plicitly warned of the negative effects of secularization on social life, he
has pointed out that Christianity itself has been a major force promoting
secularization and the loss of the social ties and constraints that dignify
local communities. Conversely, David Martin (Tongues of Fire: The Ex-
plosion of Protestantism in Latin America [Blackwell, 1990]) has pointed
out that Christianity not only dissolves some forms of traditional obliga-
tion but creates new networks of affiliation and obligation to replace the
old. Unlike the sociologists whom Flanagan finds illiterate with regard to
religion and theology, Martin’s work is theologically sensitive and acute.
Wilson and Martin are not the only sociologists whose work Flanagan
fails to appreciate; Niklas Luhmann also receives unnecessarily abbrevi-
ated treatment, and his work on societal differentiation and on the evolu-
tion of religious beliefs is ignored. On the other hand, Flanagan has a
particularly high regard for Bourdieu, whose work he finds convenient
for discussing the ambiguities of symbolic production and consumption
and for suggesting the presence of the sacred in an allegedly postmodern
and postsecular world.
Toward the end of his reflections, Flanagan reverses his field. Instead
of finding a dearth of meaning in the world, he discovers a surplus: an
excess of form over content, as he puts it, in his discussion of Georg Sim-
mel. However, there is no way for individuals to sort out all these mean-
ings or to come to terms with them. Modern individuals have lost the
disciplines that enable them to relate form and content to their own expe-
rience. It has been a function of magic to protect individuals from the
surplus of meaning and to reduce that surplus to something that an indi-
vidual can grasp. This is now a function, however, that Flanagan attri-
butes to sociology, although he implies that sociologists lack the grace to
know that they are standing, so to speak, on holy ground. Hence, he
would argue, sociology should seek a certain reenchantment.
Magic, however, is the disease as well as the cure, a recipe for disap-
pointment and renewed helplessness. Unfortunately, Flanagan appears
to ignore this point in his longing for a return to an enchanted universe.
With his yearnings, it is therefore not surprising that he complains of
melancholy and malaise and sees signs of hope primarily in religious vir-
tuosos who have recently rediscovered the monastic vocation. Flanagan
wants very much indeed to move beyond dry sociological theory toward
a genuine and more conclusive engagement with theology. Unfortunately,
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he finds theology by now far too sociological to understand its own basis
in faith and grace. After reading this challenging and sometimes acute
book, I would hope that Flanagan himself would engage more directly
in theological pursuits rather than wait for sociology to become reen-
chanted.
Religion and Mass Media: Audiences and Adaptations. Edited by Daniel A.
Stout and Judith M. Buddenbaum. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publica-
tions, 1996. Pp. 294. $48.00 (cloth); $22.95 (paper).
Jennifer L. McKinney
Purdue University
There is no question that media and religion are important elements in
U.S. society. Researchers in both mass communication and the sociology
of religion have developed strong literatures in these fields, yet neither
tends to include the other. In Religion and the Mass Media, Stout and
Buddenbaum provide essays integrating these two areas to examine reli-
gious institutions and audiences. The significance of this lies in the fact
that previous research in these areas has focused on a content-centered
approach. Stout and Buddenbaum explore religion and the media center-
ing on the audience, asking, What do churchgoers themselves have to
say about media and religion?
The first three sections of the book encompass the current status of
religion and media research, institutional perspectives of media, and au-
dience behavior. Current and past research is summarized first, situating
the reader within the interdisciplinary approach to religion and the me-
dia. Several explanations for mass media use, including community inte-
gration, secularization theory, ideological frameworks, and psychological
perspectives are described. The historical contexts of media use by U.S.
Christian groups guides the second section, highlighting how these groups
have incorporated the emergence of media into institutional teachings,
evangelistic efforts, and preference/avoidance strategies of media use.
Four empirical studies on the comparative use of media across Christian
traditions explain how audience members respond to and then practice
their religious directives. These studies demonstrate the relationship be-
tween religion and tolerance, differential newspaper use and orientations
between groups, and group reactions to potentially threatening media
events.
The last two sections of the book include case studies and the future
of religion in the information society. The case studies focus on audience
member adaptations of mass media in everyday life. Mormons and fun-
damentalists display within group differences of media use, while Quaker
and Mennonite groups utilize various strategies for media use that main-
tain identity in the face of and even through the media. The use/avoid-
ance of “gospel rap” in the black church is also explored. Each study
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underlines the point that, although media use by religious groups varies,
media plays a very important role in the everyday lives of religious audi-
ences, in support or in spite of institutional directives. Jorge Reina
Schement and Hester C. Stephenson conclude by analyzing how media
roles are defined and what this means in the emerging information soci-
ety. These authors explore major trends that shape awareness, as well as
major tensions that dominate the information society, and the subsequent
implications these have for the practice of religion.
Stout and Buddenbaum have collected essays that take a pointedly
different approach to the study of religion and mass media. However,
in achieving “a creative synthesis of ideas between mass communication
research and the sociology of religion” (p. 5), they fall a little short. Al-
though the emphasis is on integrating these two disciplines, the editors
have selected essays that account for religion and media from a communi-
cation perspective. In fact, no sociologists of religion have contributed to
this collection. Sociological concepts are included, such as secularization
theory and Merton’s community integration, but these concepts are sim-
ply points of departure. Sociological theory does not overtly drive any of
the essays, expanding on, or adding to current sociology of religion.
The editors of this book initially situate the reader in the current state
of research in religion and mass media. This is followed by a selection
of essays that track the use of media within the traditions of Catholicism,
mainline Protestantism, evangelicalism, fundamentalism, and Mormon-
ism. These historical contexts, particularly Quentin J. Schultze’s analysis
of evangelicals, are excellent reviews of doctrinal and practical media
use by these religious organizations. This particular section is a valuable
resource for anyone interested in religion, communication, or the integra-
tion of these two areas.
A second critique, then, lies in the book’s consistency. The historical
contexts of the traditions set forth in section 2 should set up and organize
the essays in the following sections, giving a solid overall view to these
particular religious bodies. The remaining empirical and case studies,
however, do not follow explicitly from these five traditions, resulting in
the second half of the book becoming less focused. Catholic groups are
not included in the following case studies, and although Quaker, Men-
nonite, and black church groups can be folded into one or a mixture of
the previously discussed traditions, an understanding of their media use
in a larger historical context would certainly enrich and tighten the focus
of the collection.
Despite some of these shortcomings, Religion and Mass Media initiates
an intriguing dialogue between researchers in communication and the
sociology of religion. This book takes a fresh approach toward research,
stimulating many new research questions. As the editors note, “Given the
importance of religion and the mass media in U.S. society, however, the
potential value of conducting research in this area seems well worth the
effort” (p. 30), and so it does.
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The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity: A Sociohistorical Ap-
proach to Religious Transformation. By James C. Russell. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. ix1258. $42.00 (cloth); $15.95 (paper).
Lutz Kaelber
Lyndon State College
Religions differ in their approaches toward the secular sphere. As Max
Weber noted, those religions that combine a dualist conception of the
nature of the universe with the notion of a personal divine creator tend
to devalue the worldly realm. Their religious teachings encourage believ-
ers to look past this world and to set their hopes on the beyond instead.
Weber termed this a world-rejecting worldview. Nondualist belief sys-
tems and religions espousing the idea of impersonal eternal order, in con-
trast, are more likely to hold favorable views on what goes on in this
world; consequently, they are more likely to adopt a world-accepting
worldview. James Russell’s book, which is a revision of the author’s doc-
toral dissertation in historical theology, discusses what happens when
these different perspectives collide. It does so in the context of what is
commonly called the Christianization of Germanic peoples in early medi-
eval Europe. Russell describes this as a cultural encounter between a pre-
dominantly world-accepting Indo-European folk religion and the world-
rejecting views of Christian missionaries. His thesis is aptly captured in
the title of the book, namely that the Christianization of early medieval
Europe was equally a Germanization of early medieval Christianity.
Russell’s argument, while valid to a point, is hardly as novel as it might
appear to be. It has long been established that the early medieval Chris-
tian Church was heavily involved in ideological boundary work, by
which it actively recommissioned some previously inadmissable pagan
acts in new forms for Christian ends. As historians have noted, Christian
missionaries faced ample competition in the form of diviners, soothsayers,
and other manipulators of the supernatural. A well-established part of
the culture of pre-Christianized peoples, these magicians offered those
who sought their services the affirmation of some preternatural control
over nature at a time of widespread social and political instability. Rather
than taking this cultural world head on, for which it had neither the
personnel nor the necessary means of communication, the Church selec-
tively borrowed practices from competing pagan manipulators and pro-
moted these practices as part of a pool of interceding acts considered
legitimate for Christian purposes. At the same time, the Church vilified
those who continued to perform such practices under a different authority
and without its sanction. Places where people revered stones, fountains,
or trees were turned into sites for oratories, chapels, and shrines. Even
the drawing of lots and certain forms of astrology were cast into Christian
molds. In turn, some licit religious artifacts proved to be amenable to
manipulation, as Christian formulas turned into spells and the conse-
crated host was put to magical use. In the realignment of religious wor-
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ship and magical manipulations, many, but of course not all, of these
practices came to run together. A strong Germanic influence on Chris-
tianity, Russell argues, can also be found in the development of a proprie-
tary church system, certain military ideals, notions of sacral kingship, and
the Adelsheiligwesen.
Most of this has been known for some time, so the value of Russell’s
book falls or rises with the adequacy of its theoretical underpinning and
the accuracy of its historical analysis. Serious problems exist in both re-
gards. Russell is apparently unaware that the very concepts of world re-
jection and world acceptance have their origin in the writings of Weber,
whom he mentions all but twice. He consequently also fails to consider
Wolfgang Schluchter’s recent theoretical elaborations on this subject.
Rather than a coherent argument informed by sociological theory, Rus-
sell’s approach to religious change seems more like an assembly of dis-
junct and at times trivial propositions, the empirical usefulness of which
remains in doubt. For example, he states that “social structure influences
ideological structure and both contribute significantly to a society’s gen-
eral religious orientation” (p. 102). What insight is gained by such a state-
ment, touted as a “fundamental postulate” of a general model of religious
transformation? Is it useful to describe, in a different context, the
worldview of early medieval Germanic societies as “sociobiological” (p.
212)?
The weakness of the book’s theoretical formulations are complemented
by a historical part that, to a significant extent, consists of an assortment
of long quotations in the text and footnotes. Russell habitually tells the
reader what various scholars have asserted, stated, observed, noted, dis-
cussed, shown, and summarized—without any critical discussion of the
views presented. In doing so he all too often mixes arguments that derive
from notable analyses of the subject with those of somewhat dubious
scholarly merit. It remains unclear, not only how much this study goes
beyond what has already been established in historical scholarship (e.g.,
Valerie Flint’s magisterial Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe
[Princeton University Press, 1991]), but also whether its author has
achieved a solid mastery of the relevant literature. For these reasons, I
can recommend Russell’s book only with grave reservations.
Social Change and the Middle Classes. Edited by Tim Butler and Mike
Savage. London: University College of London Press, 1995. Pp. xii1388.
$29.95 (paper).
Mark Western
Australian National University
Whether the object is to theorize how professional and managerial occu-
pations fit into the class structure or to understand middle-class politics
or how a diversifying class structure figures in debates about the “death
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of class,” contemporary class analysis is increasingly concerned with the
middle-class(es) in advanced capitalism. Social Change and the Middle
Classes examines these issues in recent British society. It is primarily a
textbook but contains sufficient new material to also represent the current
state of play of British social science in this area.
The book is underwritten by a “class formation problematic” (p. 23)
in which class analysis is about examining if and how class structural
relations give rise to social collectivities. This approach combines a mini-
malist view of class structure with a maximalist understanding of class
formation. The causal significance of class structure in different areas of
social life is an open empirical question, not an a priori assumption, but
the kinds of collectivities that potentially emerge are multifarious. Thus,
chapters take up (among other things) issues of gender and race in class
formation, changing professional and managerial careers, the impact of
public-sector restructuring on middle-class state employment, middle-
class use of domestic servants, links between geographic and worklife
mobility, the role of the middle classes in “colonizing” the British country-
side, class differences in diet and home ownership, and middle-class poli-
tics. Yet despite its scope, the book is extremely well integrated because
several questions emerge repeatedly: What does the class formation prob-
lematic entail? How should the middle class be conceptualized to best
explain class formation? How are class processes changing over time?
The dominant figure in British class analysis is undoubtedly John
Goldthorpe, and many chapters engage either his conception of the mid-
dle class or his class analytic agenda. Goldthorpe asserts that professional,
administrative, and managerial employees form a “service class” distin-
guished from other employees by the relationship they have with their
employers. In contrast to contractual relationships in which nonservice-
class employees exchange specific tasks for specific rewards, the service
relationship is defined primarily by prospective benefits that service-class
members anticipate over their working lives. Expectations about future
benefits link the interests of service-class employees to those of their em-
ployers and predispose them to political conservatism. Recently, however,
Mike Savage, James Barlow, Peter Dickens, and Tony Fielding (Prop-
erty, Bureaucracy and Culture: Middle Class Formation in Contemporary
Britain [Routledge, 1992]) have adapted Erik Wright’s conceptualization
to explain British middle-class formation in terms of the way profession-
als and managers mobilize property, cultural, and organizational re-
sources. In concrete terms, the difference in the views of Goldthorpe and
Savage et al. comes down to a disagreement about whether managers
and professionals constitute a single class or different middle-class frac-
tions and the consequent implications this has for class formation. Two
early theoretical chapters in Social Change and the Middle Classes ad-
dress these issues, while the empirical chapters on career mobility, re-
gional mobility, diet, and politics also examine how well service-class and
asset-based conceptions explain differing aspects of class formation. Con-
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cluding chapters by Goldthorpe and by Savage and Butler are especially
useful in clarifying how the two perspectives differ.
Other chapters, particularly those dealing with the intersection of class
and gender, interrogate the concept of class formation through a critique
of Goldthorpe’s agenda for class analysis. Goldthorpe has prescribed a
research program that takes the structure of class locations as given and
investigates mobility patterns and sociopolitical class formation as condi-
tional on this structure. In their chapters, Anne Witz and Rosemary
Crompton argue that this characterization misses fundamental questions
about the intersection of class and gender relations, particularly those
pertaining to the way sex-segregated class and occupational structures
arise and the extent to which men’s mobility opportunities are predicated
on women’s exclusion from privileged class locations and the domestic
labor of service-class wives. Crompton further asserts that as women in-
creasingly enter middle-class occupations, the service class will fragment
into a range of household types that will undermine its putative soli-
darity.
Crompton’s chapter also highlights the third recurring theme of the
book—social change. The contemporary reorganization of class processes
is a major focus of chapters dealing with public-sector employment, black
middle-class formation, middle-class careers, the spatiality of class forma-
tion, middle-class politics, and middle-class consumption.
Overall, this book presents British class analysis as theoretically so-
phisticated, substantively informed, and committed to empirical analysis.
It also demonstrates the power of class analysis to inform investigations
of social action and social change. U.S. researchers should find it invalu-
able as a summary of recent British research and a comprehensive treat-
ment of contemporary British society.
Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power. By
Gary Herrigel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. x1480.
$54.95.
Sidney Pollard
University of Sheffield
The thesis of this book is that the traditional accounts of Germany’s as-
tonishing rise to industrial power from the 1870s to the present, which
concentrate on the large units in cartelized industries aided by the large
universal banks, are incomplete. For a full understanding, we have to
give equal weight to a range of other industries, consisting of medium-
and small-sized firms and financed by regional or cooperative banks. The
leading Konzerne in the former sector, above all in iron and steel, coal
mining, chemicals, and electrical engineering, were generally able to
stand alone and are here dubbed autark. The other set, mainly consumer
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goods producers but also some types of engineering, depended on special-
ization backed by complex horizontal and vertical linkages to obtain
components or fulfill mixed orders and is termed “decentralized.” The
structure was clearly regional; some regions, such as the Ruhr or Si-
lesia, contained only the autarkic type, while others, such as Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg or Saxony, were devoted exclusively to decentralized indus-
tries. The political structure of Germany, from the separate governments
included in the Kaiserreich to the federalism imposed by the Allies after
1945, lent itself easily to such regional specialization, but the central govern-
ment always managed to devise policies to benefit both types of region.
No brief review can do justice to the wealth of detail and the broad
range of sources with which this thesis is supported, backed as it is by
footnote discussions that add 50% to the length of the book. Though the
prevalence of smaller firms has not gone unnoticed in the past, beginning
with Clapham’s classic text (Economic Development of France and Ger-
many 1815–1914 [Cambridge University Press, (1921) 1963], pp. 287–88),
this very important contribution will make it impossible, at least in the
English language literature, to neglect in future the role of the nonautar-
kic industries in the economic rise of Germany.
Yet many misgivings remain, largely because of the absolute, all-or-
nothing tendency to squeeze the complexities of German economic history
into a rigid schema of this kind. Regions, and even industries, were sim-
ply not all of one type or the other. The historical account in consequence
is peppered with what at one point is rather engagingly called “rule-
proving exception(s)” (p. 232). Moreover, there were many more influ-
ences upon Germany’s economic development than the internal and
external structure of firms and the varying training and skill of the work-
force, on which this thesis is almost exclusively based.
For example, the on-going debate on the extent to which an emergent
regional factory industry was benefited by a previously existing domestic
industry, in which both sides can cite numerous historical examples, is
simply brushed aside by the dogma that traditional regions could not
tolerate major innovations and were therefore avoided by the new indus-
tries. Thus the reader is startled to learn that the modern steel industry
settled in the Ruhr district, not merely because of the coal and the water-
ways linking to the iron and the markets, but because there had been no
traditional steel-making industry there. A brief glance at Sheffield, lead-
ing center of the old and pioneer of the new, would have shown this view
to be untenable. Indeed, the failure to cast any glance abroad, in what
is after all a fairly generalized view of industrial history, is a major failing
of this book. Again, in the Wilhelmine Reich, the one-sided high-tariff
protection for iron and steel as well as for grain imposed harmful cost
increases on the finished goods industries, but there was no question of
even-handed help for them. In Weimar, the division of interests was not,
as stated here, so much autarkic versus decentralized industry as it was
successful exporters versus those depending on the shrinking home mar-
ket. Moreover, the bitter debate on social expenditure and its effect on
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state-industry relations, a major issue that split industry and society, does
not fit the schema and thus fails to get its due.
Lastly, the attempt in the final pages to draw far-reaching conclusions
on Germany’s future from the results, and possibly short-term blips, of
one or two recent years, would seem to fit more appropriately into a jour-
nalistic essay than a serious history. The structural analysis of the earlier
chapters, even were it wholly acceptable, can surely provide no legitimate
base for ad hoc prophecies.
He who offers sweeping generalizations must expect to be subject to
detailed and perhaps even niggling criticism: this does not detract from
the value of new perspectives. Backed, as they are in this case, by rich
detail and knowledgeable insight, they make an important contribution
that no one in the future will be able to ignore.
Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 1450–1815.
By Philip T. Hoffman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Pp. xiv1361. $39.50
Jack A. Goldstone
University of California—Davis
Major controversies in early modern history may now be approaching
closure, thanks to the painstaking work of Philip T. Hoffman. Did
French agriculture lag behind that of England and the Netherlands? And
was this due to differences in communal land practices, or farm size, or
taxation? For those seeking answers to these questions, Growth in a Tra-
ditional Society will be an essential, indeed foundational, work.
Distilling the work of over a decade in the archives, Hoffman presents
new and exceptionally detailed data on French agricultural productivity.
The main data are drawn from the lease records of Notre Dame, one of
the largest landholders in the Parisian Basin. These data are comple-
mented by leases drawn from 19 additional sites around France, which
Hoffman follows for three centuries prior to the French Revolution. Not
only are Hoffman’s data new, so too is his analysis. Hoffman aims at the
economists’ ultimate measure of agrarian efficiency: total factor produc-
tivity (TFP). This is calculated by using the lease data and price data to
obtain the total costs of the inputs for each farm (land rents, taxes, animal
rentals, wages paid for labor) and comparing those costs with the prices
of the outputs (crops and animal products). When price weighted for their
shares in production and output, these figures can produce estimates of
how much “value added” the farmer provides; in other words, what out-
put he/she gets for a given level of inputs. When these figures are tracked
over time, as Hoffman does, we can see the pace of agricultural improve-
ment down the centuries.
Hoffman’s results are sometimes reassuring, sometimes startling, but
always backed by detailed investigation of the data, and careful consider-
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ation of alternative explanations. Although his findings are too rich to
summarize fully in a review, three main results stand out.
First, Robert Brenner, who in the famous “Brenner debates” argued
that the class structure of landholding in France shackled its agriculture,
is simply wrong. Brenner maintained that the tiny sizes and high rents
of French peasant farms, the result of landlord domination of a prostrate
peasantry, prohibited high productivity. Yet this picture is mistaken on
every count. French farms with tiny plots and high rents did exist in
large numbers in the Paris Basin. But despite their large numbers, they
covered only a small part of the total farmland and were not the major
source of grain for sale. These small farms were more like the cottage
gardens of English day laborers. The French peasants who leased these
plots were essentially wage workers on larger commercial farms, who
kept a small plot to farm on their own. Thus in years when wages were
low, a small garden plot provided them a bit of insurance against dearth.
In fact, larger farms, which though less numerous covered a far greater
area, paid lower rents, grew crops mainly for market, and—at least in
the Paris Basin—were as productive as most regions in England.
French agricultural productivity growth lagged badly not in the areas
with tiny peasant plots, which only existed where large, efficient commer-
cial farms also provided wage opportunities, but in the areas of medium-
size family farms. These farms—which covered most of France outside
the Paris Basin—lacked the capital, the market opportunities, and the
specialization that led to increased productivity. These family farms
throughout France, not the tiny plots of wage workers in regions near
Paris, were the reason for the relative backwardness of French agricul-
ture.
Second, the great French rural historians—Marc Bloch, Pierre Gou-
bert, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie—were at least half right. They had ar-
gued that French agriculture had remained almost unchanged, immobile,
from the late Middle Ages right up to the Revolution. Hoffman shows
this to be largely true as a gross average. But it was far from wholly true
of all times and places. Hoffman shows that productivity gains in the
Paris Basin were consistently high, with total outputs comparable to
those of southern England. Moreover, although other parts of France had
very little long-term productivity growth, this overall stasis concealed pe-
riods of healthy agricultural growth (mainly in peace and good climate)
that were undone at intervals by the predations of war, which destroyed
accumulated capital in land improvements and livestock and set back
productivity by decades. In other words, the pattern of French productiv-
ity growth is like a chessboard: seen from a distance, it appears a grainy
brown, but when examined in detail, it has areas of light interspersed
with areas of dark.
Third, Hoffman confirms my own estimates and those of Ernest La-
brousse regarding the contribution that lagging agricultural productivity
growth made to economic pressures in the years leading up to the French
Revolution. While recent revisionists have suggested that there was really
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little difference between England and France prior to the Industrial Rev-
olution, and that French agriculture experienced its own period of rapid
gains in the 17th and 18th centuries, Hoffman shows that such arguments
are off base. As Hoffman puts it (pp. 132–35), “The overall performance
of French agriculture was disappointing, even under optimistic assump-
tions. . . . Ultimately, it took them three centuries to accomplish what
the English did in two. [In the centuries prior to the Revolution] food
supply grew by less than 0.22 percent per year [while] the French popula-
tion . . . rose at . . . 0.21 to 0.32 percent per year.” Although Paris’s imme-
diate hinterland showed great gains after 1750, this did not change the
picture, for “the local food supply perhaps tripled between 1500 and 1789,
but the city’s population nearly quadrupled,” and Paris merchants were
forced to move ever farther afield, into areas with lower productivity, to
seek food for the capital. As a result, “food prices climbed, and real wages
. . . failed to keep up. Only landlords had reason to be gleeful, as rents
soared under the pressure of the population.”
In sum, French agriculture was capable of great progress, but only
where capital, large urban markets, and commercial farms combined.
Unfortunately for France, such areas were few. More commonly produc-
tivity stagnated, leaving France prone to periods of economic distress
when population surged. For presenting this story with unprecedented
detail and evidence, and, I should add, clear style and rich argument, we
are indebted to Hoffman.
Time Pioneers: Flexible Working Time and New Lifestyles. By Karl H.
Horning, Anette Gerhard, and Matthias Michailow. Translated by An-
thony Williams. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. Pp. xi1198. $54.95.
Graeme Salaman
Open University
This book is about time. It is about a group of people for whom the
flexibilization of their working time is intended to secure that they “have
more time.” These people are called “time pioneers” (TPs), since they are
seen to pioneer a new approach to a contested resource—time itself. The
authors see the TPs as spearheading a new response to employers’ de-
mands—not with respect to the traditional trade-off between effort and
wages, nor even necessarily over the sheer quantity of time worked, but
over the flexibility of working hours. TPs do not wish simply to reconfig-
ure their working time to make their work more convenient for other
schedules: they wish time for themselves. And they are prepared to pay
for it: to trade working hours for their own time. They seek to reconfigure
the prevailing time-money exchange by reorganizing everyday life in
terms of time.
The analysis is based on the primacy of “lifestyle” as an explanatory
concept, which here refers to the capacity for making subjective prioritiz-
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ations and interpretations. The focus is thus on choice, associated with
individuality and identity. The study claims to address the role of subjec-
tively meaningful time in the constitution of identities—to use time as
an analytical category to investigate the conduct of life, the construction
of identity and of meaning. Thus the study is not simply of people who
wish to shift the boundaries between work and nonwork time, but rather
of the possibility that such shifts indicate new social perceptions of time.
The research group was selected by criteria that would identify new
forms of time utilization. The researchers specifically set out to find peo-
ple whose working arrangements deviated from standard working time
in a number of practical ways concerning their temporal employment
arrangements. However, qualitative criteria were also used to ensure that
respondents not only experienced specific employment arrangements but
had a definite subjective approach to, placed a high value on, and had
a sensitivity toward time. The study’s conclusions are based explicitly on
data gathered from this carefully selected sample.
Chapter 2 describes the characteristic time attitudes of the TPs in con-
trast to conventional attitudes and locates these in the context of employ-
ers’ efforts to (re)organize working time in accordance to their priorities.
The study focuses on the ways in which TPs’ efforts are contested within
the employment relationship. Flexibilization of and reduction in working
time frequently result in the intensification of work content, through a
number of employer strategies. Other difficulties are also noted, including
the impact on relations with colleagues and superiors and on the TPs’
capacity to demonstrate and substantiate work performance.
Chapter 3 addresses the work attitudes of the TPs and discusses the
difficulties they encountered in dealing with the reactions of their conven-
tional colleagues—reactions that reveal a clear set of interpretative
schema about the meaning of work, identity, and time (e.g., that “free
time” is determined by working time).
Clearly the TPs’ decisions about working time have major implications
for their income, and TPs are required not simply to manage reduced
incomes but to devise strategies whereby they need less money, establish
new household regimes, rely on DIY (do it yourself), networking, and so
on. This is explored in chapter 5. The time-money balance is now recon-
figured in a way in which expenditure patterns and levels are geared to
a prime commitment to low and flexible level of time commitment.
At its extreme this reconceptualization of the time-money exchange be-
comes more than a strategy for getting by with less: it directly questions
the central social mechanisms which posit the convertibility of time and
money. Chapter 6 furthers the discussion of the TPs’ new lifestyle, with
its central rejection of the centrality of work and employment to identity,
an associated fundamental revision of consumer patterns and habits, and
an increase in self-control over the shaping of individuals’ lives. The final
chapter raises some further implications of the study.
The book is useful for its analysis of a relatively underresearched phe-
nomenon. Although TPs are not—despite the claim of the authors—a
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new phenomenon, they still merit attention particularly at a time when
employers, through “downsizing,” reengineering, and other initiatives are
intensifying employees’ contributions to the wage/effort exchange. The
book certainly advances our understanding of the content and implica-
tions of the TPs’ approach, if it does not greatly help us to understand
the etiology of this approach. The weaknesses of the book arise from three
features. First, the very focus on TPs as a distinctive and discrete cluster
of attitudes may, paradoxically, serve to represent the “conventional” ap-
proach as more homogeneous and unreflexive than it is in reality. It may
be that the TPs’ portrayal of the conventional approach reflects their
need to define their position as much as it draws any stark and persistent
differences between TPs and non-TPs. Second, it would be useful to be
able to position this analysis demographically, with respect to locations
within the lifecycle. For example, are the young more or less likely to
adopt this stance? Third, while there are en passant references to current
discussions of issues of identity, the full wealth of the possible explora-
tions of these connections is underdeveloped. Specifically, the relationship
between consumption and identity is handled in a restricted manner,
whereby TPs’ identities are seen to involve a unique and distinctive bal-
ance between employment, nonwork, and consumption elements. But this
discussion is not grounded in recent debates about the ways in which
new forms of organizational practice have influenced issues of identity
and in particular have blurred differences between production and con-
sumption identities; thus the analysis of identities is somewhat limited.
Finally, while the analysis of contemporary changes in the role of work
in identities is timely and important, it is necessary to note that what it
means to be a worker or an employee is not and never has been set rigidly
but has always been dependent on historical and cultural conditions.
Work has no more “real” meaning than time; and it is one of the strengths
of this book that it advances our understanding of the historically and
socially contingent nature of the role of both of these in identities.
The Business of Practicing Law: The Work Lives of Solo and Small-Firm
Attorneys. By Carroll Seron. Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1996. Pp. xiv1224. $49.95 (cloth); $22.95 (paper).
George Gonos
Centenary College
The tension between the traditional norms of professionalism and a ram-
pant new commercialism is being felt across a range of fields, and Carroll
Seron’s book, delving into the dilemmas this tension has created in the
legal field, provides a valuable sociological treatment of the subject. Since
the late 1970s, the loosening of rules surrounding legal advertising has
spawned a growing number of highly visible firms that operate on the
principle of business efficiency. Seron asks whether such entrepreneurial
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firms are replacing more traditional legal practices. Through in-depth in-
terviews with 102 solo and small-firm lawyers in the New York regional
metropolitan area, she inquires into how legal professionals are con-
structing their practices and professional identities given the competing
value orientations and options now available in the field.
Rather than a linear trend toward more commercialized firms, Seron
finds that the legal field, fueled by robust growth in the suburban service
economy, sustains a range of approaches to practice coexisting in “ex-
panding but mutually exclusive segments of the market” (p. 105). Three
distinct types of practitioners are delineated—traditionalists, experiment-
ers, and entrepreneurs—and Seron’s interviews focus on the different
strategies each pursues with regard to three key aspects of legal prac-
tice—getting business, organizing work, and serving clients.
The continued predominance of traditional firms is a major finding.
These firms are deeply rooted in local communities and built on collegial,
family-like bonds between partners. (It may be disconcerting to find out
that, typically, these firms are founded only on a handshake since, as one
attorney says, a written agreement “doesn’t really mean anything” [p.
70].) Though they believe lawyers should have the right to advertise, the
consensus among traditionalists is that unprofessional advertising is
wrong. Their primary means of acquiring clients is the careful cultivation
of contacts through extracurricular activities, e.g., joining the “animal”
clubs. With respect to office technology, they describe themselves (with
pride) as computer illiterate and prefer dictation to the computer termi-
nal. Since their legal work is routine, social skills are considered more
important than technical knowledge; hence, the work—dealing with indi-
vidual clients with “real” problems—retains a craft-like feel.
While the experimenters may dabble with advertising, the entrepre-
neurs use it extensively. They serve not clients, but consumers who, they
believe, want legal services to be “cheap and fast” (p. 108). Here, there
may be “not even a veneer of collegiality” (p. 98). Manager-partners de-
sign marketing plans and training manuals and develop standardized
procedures for handling cases. Clients have extended contact with parale-
gals and only limited access to attorney-employees (or independent con-
tractors). Computerization allows the entrepreneurs to make a “system-
atic assessment of the return on their marketing and managerial
investments” (p. 87).
The persistence of a “deeply gendered” (p. 68) pattern of organization
across both traditional and entrepreneurial firms is a theme sustained
throughout the book. Through reports elicited about their working days
and the division of labor at home, Seron finds that female attorneys “actu-
ally share with their male counterparts a deeply traditional and conserva-
tive value orientation about ‘proper’ gender roles” (p. 17) and that only
in rare cases have they attempted to renegotiate the division of household
obligations with their husbands. Male attorneys thus have the advantage
of making private arrangements that free them to put in the “expanded
professional hours” that are pivotal for effective business development.
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At the office as well, Seron finds that small-firm attorneys rely on a tradi-
tional division of labor between professionals and support staff (“our
girls”).
Other genuinely intriguing aspects of this study must be left aside to
take up a more general concern. Though Seron states that the newer en-
trepreneurial firms “have gone beyond the somewhat rigid, factorylike
model developed by Jacoby and Meyers” in the direction of greater “cre-
ative flexibility” (p. 97), such claims are left unsupported by her data.
With the legal profession’s standardized product, hierarchical decision
making, and so on, the reader is struck by just how thoroughly Fordist
these operations appear. Similarly, Seron’s frequent assertions to the ef-
fect that the entrepreneurial firms represent “a model of postindustrial
design” (p. 20) seem based on a superficial use of the term postindustrial
and a distortion of the original theory to which it refers that typically
understood law as something like an objective arbiter of universalist
value orientation, not a commodity for sale. Further, by implying that
technological change and general economic development have driven the
trend toward the commercialization of legal practice, the postindustrial
formulation understates the importance of political choice.
Overall, however, Seron’s work delivers on its promise to further our
understanding of attorneys’ work lives in the context of structural
change. Considering that its subject area is one in which laments about
the demise of professionalism are often substituted for real data, this is
a much needed piece of research that will be appreciated by those with
interest in the sociology of the professions and, more generally, in work,
gender, and inequality.
Moral Codes and Social Structure in Ancient Greece: A Sociology of
Greek Ethics from Homer to the Epicureans and the Stoics. By Joseph
M. Bryant. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp.
xv1575. $27.95 (paper).
Joseph Roisman
Colby College
In this ambitious book, Joseph Bryant writes a historical sociology of the
political, social, and intellectual life of the ancient Greeks from the Dark
Age to early Hellenistic times (ca. 800–300 b.c.e.). Closely following We-
ber’s and Marx’s perspectives on ancient economy and the state, Bryant
seeks to combine sociological, historical, literary, and philosophical analy-
ses in discussing Greek institutions and moral codes. Bryant’s horizons
are commendably wide; the endeavor, however, is only partially suc-
cessful.
The thesis of the book will be familiar to readers of Weber or of Moses
Finley, Weber’s most influential follower among ancient historians. Bry-
ant examines the economic, political, military, religious, and family insti-
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tutions of the Greeks and links them directly to their values, norms, and
ethics. He proceeds to show that any change in the former leads to a
response in the latter. The book focuses on the nexus between citizen and
polis (or city-state), which Bryant identifies as the essence of the male
Greek’s experience. He views Greek history as a cyclic process that be-
gins with the individualistic, aristocratic hero of the Homeric epics, cul-
minates in a polis that is a communality of citizens, and concludes with
the individualism of the inhabitants of the Hellenistic city. The Homeric
warrior monopolized economic and political resources and any claim for
honor and military prowess. Greater prosperity and changes in warfare
that emphasized collective effort by the heavy infantrymen, or hoplites,
led to greater equality in the legal and political rights of the citizens. The
process of democratization, though only available to adult male citizens,
was reflected in a value system that stressed collective spirit, patriotism,
and self-fulfillment through civic service (p. xiii). Limited economic re-
sources pushed the Greeks into acquisitive, predatory conduct both in
interpolis warfare and domestic factionalism. These, in turn, exacted a
heavy toll on the citizens and undermined the integrative function of the
polis’s institutions. The gaps between rich and poor, the prevalence of
unattached mercenaries, and general depolitization weakened the state
and its communal, egalitarian-oriented ethos. In the 4th century, the polis
was unable to resist the monolithic power of Macedon and lost the corner-
stone of its being, independence.
Within this process, Bryant situates intellectual products that mirrored
their age. Thus Homer described the aristocratic ethos and Hesiod the
commoner’s protest of the dark and archaic ages. Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle tried to save the classical polis by suggesting ways of strengthen-
ing communal bonds in the face of threatening circumstances. The Cyn-
ics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics gave up on the polis and offered as
an alternative individualistic self-fulfillment.
My simplification of the author’s leading thesis is dictated by the con-
straints of a short review. The book offers a wealth of information, and
Bryant’s descriptions are often lucid and useful for the layperson—when,
for example, he describes Socratic or Platonic thinking—but the work
suffers from some fundamental problems as well.
Integrating sociology, history, philosophy, and literature is a task full
of tension, because each discipline pulls toward its particular methods
and theorems. Such methodological difficulty can be overcome when
dealing with a relatively limited topic, but not when dealing with the
entire political and cultural history of the independent polis. To accom-
modate his holistic view, Bryant opts for a textbook format, and his ac-
count, though often sound, is largely familiar. There are lengthy, irrele-
vant discussions (especially of philosophy) and a strong inclination
toward generalization, polarization of attitudes, economic determinism,
and reductionism. For example, he admits that politics governed econ-
omy in the polis but explains wars as an economic necessity. Thus, he
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excludes the causal role of, say, individual leaders, prestige, friendship,
or even the function of war in fostering unity.
Bryant’s attempt to identify intellectual products with a particular
class view negates the universal appeal of the work. The historical out-
look is often class oriented and informed by traditional scholarship. Miss-
ing are structuralist and anthropological insights or modern reassess-
ments of the evidence. Such omissions are especially telling in the
discussion of the Hellenistic age (chap. 6). Bryant resurrects the view that
links the “collapse” of the polis with Hellenistic moral philosophy that
focused on individual, rather than communal, Greek experience. But the
polis’s loss of independence did not mean that it ceased being a very
significant focus of political and social life. In fact, the cities took on new
responsibilities regarding health care and education that could only have
strengthened the bond between polis and citizen (cf. J. K. Davies in Cam-
bridge Ancient History, 2d ed. [Cambridge University Press, 1984]: 7.1:
304–20, which is not really utilized here). Bryant does not discuss domi-
nant social institutions, such as friendship (philia), or the concept of reci-
procity, even though both were important to the moral bond between
polis and citizen. Especially regrettable is the lack of distinction between
ideology and practice or the uncritical reading of some sources. Commu-
nalism was the banner of the polis, but public control of private life was
often more wishful thinking than reality. David Cohen and Joshua Ober
have shown how amenable political and moral ideologies (themselves of-
ten fraught with internal contradictions) were to manipulations by indi-
viduals of all walks of life (David Cohen, Law Sexuality and Society
[Cambridge University Press, 1991]; Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Dem-
ocratic Athens [Princeton University Press, 1989]). Bryant takes Demos-
thenes’ rhetorical stereotyping of the pro-Macedonians as wealthy oli-
garchs as proof that the upper class supported Macedon, while the lower
class stood for war and independence. The demos in fact opposed allocat-
ing money to the Athenian war efforts. The conflict between Greece and
Macedon showed more realpolitik than class politics.
Students of social and moral institutions, especially of state and ethics,
will find Bryant an intelligent reader of Marx and Weber. They should
be aware, however, of the existence of other valid interpretations of
Greek cultural history and institutions.
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Promises to Keep: Decline and Renewal of Marriage in America. Edited
by David Popenoe, Jean Bethke Elshtain, and David Blankenhorn. Lan-
ham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996. Pp. xii1337. $59.50
(cloth); $21.95 (paper).
Linda J. Waite
University of Chicago
Promises to Keep is an edited volume tightly focused on the single issue
clearly stated in its title. The 12 substantive chapters detail changes
across various dimensions in the institution of marriage in the contempo-
rary United States, with special attention to the implications of recent
trends for children. A final chapter presents a summary of the Council
on Families in America’s report on marriage. I enjoyed this volume a
great deal, found it uniformly well written and sometimes inspired, and—
a surprise for a scholar working in precisely this area—came across some
ideas and insights that were completely new to me.
The first five chapters document the decline of marriage from various
perspectives. In “The Decline of Marriage as the Social Basis of Child-
rearing,” Barbara Dafoe Whitehead argues that children suffer when
adults approach marriage and parenthood as individualistic and expres-
sive pursuits. Increasingly, children’s needs for stability conflict with
their parents’ pursuit of individual happiness. In a chapter on values and
attitudes, Norval Glenn explores the paradox that marriage remains a
fundamental value for Americans at the same time that the proportion
who are married has fallen and reviews reasons for the decline of mar-
riage. Moira Eastman discusses current myths about marriage that have
appeared and presents figures that generally contradict them. This chap-
ter fits neatly with the next, by Arland Thornton, which presents compar-
ative and historical perspectives on family and points to the universal
importance of family-based social organization throughout the world. A
final chapter in this section of the book, by Janet Giele, outlines conserva-
tive, liberal, and feminist views of families.
The next section, titled “Religious, Legal and Cultural Dimensions,”
includes chapters by Don Browning, Milton Regan, Jr., Carl Schneider,
and Robert Weiss. In a chapter that I found especially insightful, Brow-
ning discusses both the “male problematic”—the tendency of men to mate
without making an investment in the children which result—and the “fe-
male problematic”—the tendency of women to bond tightly with their
children but much less securely with the children’s father. Browning dis-
cusses marriage as reflected in Christian family theory; Regan and
Schneider both focus on family law as it affects marriage. Regan points
out that family law has moved from status toward contract, allowing
individuals to define what they mean by marriage for themselves and,
in the process, undermining the distinctive character of the family. He
argues for a new model of status in family law, with a consideration of
the shared commitment inherent in marriage. Schneider looks at the fam-
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ily as a social institution, supported by the moral discourse in the law.
He argues that this moral discourse has diminished and makes sugges-
tions for using the law to reinstitutionalize the family. Weiss discusses
the problems inherent in parenting when the adults live in separate
households, including the difficulties in forming a parental partnership,
alliances between one parent and the child, and parental attachment.
The final section, titled “Rebuilding a Marriage Culture,” begins with
a chapter by Maggie Gallagher, who sees a shift in power away from the
married who wish to remain so toward the unmarried and spouses who
wish to leave. She argues that we must shift power back toward marriage
to recreate a promarriage culture. David Popenoe presents a series of sug-
gestions for improving marriage and, especially, children’s well-being.
These include later marriage with a lifetime commitment, withdrawal of
the mother from the labor force for at least a year after each birth, and
parental provision of most child care. In the penultimate chapter, William
Galston reviews the essential functions of the two-parent family and
sources of its decline. The last chapter summarizes the report on marriage
from the Council on Families in America and presents its extensive rec-
ommendations for changes needed to reverse the decline in marriage doc-
umented in the report.
This is a book with a point of view, a basic set of assumptions on
which the authors of the various chapters build and from which they
elaborate. Although the chapters generally make a case for a particular
point of view, they are thoughtful and well-informed. It is not possible
to provide a detailed series of recommendations for sweeping changes
without creating controversy about some of them, and that will certainly
be the case here. But I found it a pleasure to read these arguments made
by serious and concerned scholars on a topic as central as the health of
the institution of marriage. I have come to refer to this book frequently
and recommend it highly for researchers, teachers, and policymakers. It
will also interest general readers concerned with the health of the family
today.
Disaster Evacuation Behavior: Tourists and Other Transients. By
Thomas E. Drabek. Boulder, Colo.: Institute of Behavioral Science, Uni-
versity of Colorado, 1996. Pp. xvii1354. $20.00 (paper).
Russell R. Dynes
University of Delaware
There are many kinds of monographs—those that are tendentious and
those that are trivial; those whose ideas do not merit more extensive treat-
ment and those that record afterthoughts; those that explain obscure
methods and those that only explain the obscure. Consequently, it is a
treat to read a monograph that is both theoretically and pragmatically
important. Part of a series of useful monographs, it is published by the
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Natural Hazards Research and Applications Center at the University of
Colorado, Boulder.
The book needs to be placed in the author’s previous research. Thomas
Drabek, during his long and prolific career in studying disasters, has pro-
duced a succession of significant studies from issues of organizational
preparation for disaster, to later concerns with search and rescue, family
recovery, disaster evacuation, the use of microcomputers in emergency
management, and evacuation planning by the tourist industry. In addi-
tion to his own research, Drabek performed an important task for others
by summarizing the disaster literature in Human Response to Disaster
(Springer Verlag, 1986). His most current monograph fills some of the
gaps that the summary revealed.
Most evacuation studies have assumed a stable residential population
who make decisions about evacuations. In reality, all communities have
a considerable number of business travelers and homeless people at any
one point in time. Also, many disaster-prone communities are located in
areas that invite tourism. Drabek’s previous work on the tourist indus-
try’s reluctance to engage in emergency planning leads quite logically to
an examination of the evacuation behavior of transient populations. In
effect, the monograph raises the question, When people are away from
home and affected by disaster, how do they respond? More specifically,
the study centers around five objectives: (1) to describe the behavior that
culminates in evacuation from disaster sites by nonresidents; (2) to de-
scribe the variations in evacuation behavior among different types of
evacuees, events, disaster phases, and locations; (3) to identify factors that
affect variations in these behavioral sequences; (4) to document percep-
tions of disaster victims regarding evacuation policies and procedures im-
plemented in the tourist business as well as by government representa-
tives; and (5) to formulate policy recommendations for local emergency
managers and business managers.
To study transient populations requires hard work and persistence, but
the data, drawn from 800 persons, are fresh, not simply regurgitated from
someone else’s data files. The data collection, based on a moving target
in unexpected events, was innovative and described in detail.
Drabek concludes his detailed analysis from these data by indicating
certain policy challenges and goes further to suggest an action agenda.
In his preface, Gary Kreps summarizes that conclusion: “Simply put, cus-
tomers expect the tourist industry to be prepared for natural or technolog-
ical hazards and failure to be prepared during an actual emergency will
not be good for business. Disaster planning, therefore, is a sound invest-
ment for the private as well as the public sectors” (p. xvi).
The present work illustrates Drabek’s ability to reach multiple audi-
ences. His research is mainstream, rooted in his knowledge of the research
base and his use of familiar constructs, but it is conducted with an eye
toward policy implications. Such work is an asset to the discipline since
his research is both significant and interesting.
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Possible Worlds: The Social Dynamic of Virtual Reality Technology. By
Ralph Schroeder. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996. Pp. x1203.
$24.00 (cloth); $16.95 (paper).
Ken Hillis
University of Colorado—Boulder
In his introduction to this overview of the applications and implications
of virtual reality (VR) technology, Ralph Schroeder identifies the text’s
two goals. First, contributing to the sociology of technology, he aims for
an account of the emergence and significance of “VR systems,” in part,
by describing case studies of VR applications and the contexts within
which they operate. Second, Schroeder identifies a lack of interdisciplin-
ary consensus on how communications media, information technology,
and technological advances might best be explained and how this lack
impedes the development of these explanations. He, therefore, uses VR
as an organizing device for modeling the “social relation” he will identify
between technology and social forces.
To contextualize his exploration of VR’s social implications, the first
half of chapter 2 is an abbreviated history of key technical developments,
institutions, and individuals central to the technology’s genesis. An over-
view of the technical aspects of VR systems follows. Chapter 3 describes
the research and development context within which VR has developed.
Arguing that specific institutions—such as the Human Interface Technol-
ogy Lab at the University of Washington at Seattle—shape the directions
of VR development, Schroeder outlines the competitive research strate-
gies, which transcend national boundaries and distinctions among the
academy, the military, and private enterprise. Such strategies synthesize
basic research and commercial applications in the belief that VR will
transform information technology and communications networks. Chap-
ter 4 describes the educational and entertainment contexts of immersive
and screen-based VR applications. Citing American and British exam-
ples, Schroeder seems bemused that educational applications’ potential
to free users’ imaginations for building their own virtual worlds remains
underutilized, noting that the majority of applications are predesigned
entertainment environments. He suggests that failure to capitalize on
VR’s power to let users design worlds may prove an important drawback,
as future forms of VR applications will be heavily influenced by existing
configurations and uses. Turning to the contents of virtual worlds, chap-
ter 5 offers an “inventory” of the “several dominant forms” (p. 122) com-
prising VR. Schroeder provides a good account of the VR game industry
and how its products are developed and achieve marketplace acceptance.
Schroeder’s descriptive accounts of the emergence and significance of
VR exemplify the interplay or feedback between society and technology.
There is in Possible Worlds, however, a third goal not fully developed:
to critique social constructivist or postmodern “antirealist” theories cur-
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rently enjoying academic vogue. The author claims equal discomfort with
technological determinist approaches, which accord technology the status
of savior of culture, and “antirealist” or social constructionist approaches,
which, according to him, are “part and parcel” of a range of cultural phe-
nomena springing up around VR (p. 4). Claiming a “realist” and a “We-
berian” approach (never explained for nonsociologists), Schroeder sug-
gests that both VR and academic postmodernism blur nature and culture,
thereby promoting a belief that the world is increasingly an unreal place.
Chapter 6 attempts to bridge the empirical accounts preceding it and
the critique of “antirealist” approaches the author wishes to make. To do
so, Schroeder links the lifestyles and value systems of the computer hack-
ers and jammers and the San Francisco and London “smart drug”–taking
cyberclubbers, who believe that “advances in computer technology will
provide the vehicle for new ways of life” (p. 125) and cultural renovation.
The author moves to shakier ground when he critiques such theorists as
Donna Haraway and Allucquere Rosanne Stone for mirroring the uto-
pian yearnings that permeate the “cybercultures” just described. His use
of these authors suggests a misreading. Stone, for example, pointedly cri-
tiques the anomie and social fragmentation of Silicon Valley (“Will the
Real Body Please Stand Up” in Cyberspace: First Steps, edited by Mi-
chael Benedikt [MIT Press, 1992]). Haraway’s famous call, “I’d rather
be a cyborg than a goddess,” is her refusal of depoliticized mysticism. It
asserts her belief that feminists reject science at their own peril, and
not—as Schroeder infers—that she would fuse her body with technology
if the means existed.
Achieving a comprehensive understanding of a complex technology re-
quires analysis. Description constitutes a requisite step in this process.
Though numerous lists comparing and contrasting technologies and tech-
nical advances assist readers in arriving at their own conclusions,
Schroeder hesitates to provide his own analyses. Sandwiching case stud-
ies of VR between chapters probing connections between this technology
and postmodern theory lends the work an overly sketchy yet repetitive
quality and an unresolved dualism of purpose. References and endnotes
are detailed and useful and photographs well keyed to the text they en-
hance. Though short on considering the meaning of VR, Possible Worlds
is rich in empirical descriptions. This alone recommends it as a good in-
troductory text for social scientists wanting to learn more about VR. It
would be a useful component for courses on the sociology of technology
and on game playing, globalization, communications studies, and new
media.
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